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 Political campaigns are vital to democracy in the United States.  Campaigns 
educate and mobilize voters, thus making it possible for citizens (though elections) to 
select government leaders and indirectly to control public policy.  From the point of view 
of those who create them, campaigns are vehicles for winning elective office.  For 
candidates and parties, campaigns should activate and mobilize supporters while 
persuading undecided voters and demobilizing those who support the opponent. 
 This dissertation looks at one set of campaigns – those bearing on Congressional 
elections from 1992 to 2002 – with the purpose of addressing three important research 
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questions.  The first research question asks what campaigns do.  Related to that is the 
question of how that activity varies depending on who is conducting the campaign:  the 
candidate or the political party.  The second research question asks why campaigns do 
what they do.  For both candidates and parties, it is vital to create an efficient campaign 
that will maximize the probability of achieving the primary goal:  the winning of elective 
office.  The third research question asks about the effects of campaigns on voters.  
Moving beyond existing research into campaign effects, this dissertation looks at how 
candidates and parties influence turnout and vote choice behavior by focusing on those 
components of the campaign designed to reach voters. 
 The results of this study provide compelling answers to these three questions.  
First, candidate and party campaigns allocate most of their resources to voter contact 
activities, though resource allocation patterns have changed significantly over the last 
decade.  Second, competition is a key factor that candidates consider when making 
resource allocation decisions; it is less crucial when parties make resource allocation 
decisions.  Both, however, also look to what other campaigns (not just their opponents) 
are doing when making resource allocation decisions regarding overhead, fundraising, 
and grassroots campaign activities.  Third, campaign efforts have effects on voters.  
Candidate efforts both persuade and activate voters, but party efforts have little 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 In 2000, Michigan was considered a battleground state by the two Presidential 
campaigns.  The Bush and Gore campaigns purchased over 13,000 and 11,000 gross 
ratings points in television advertising, respectively.  The national political parties were 
also active in Michigan, with the RNC and DNC each purchasing around 10,000 gross 
ratings points and transferring nearly $7 million each in hard and soft money to state and 
local party committees.  It is not an understatement to say that Michigan voters were 
exposed to a vigorous campaign environment. 
 It was in this environment that Debbie Stabenow and Spence Abraham waged 
their campaigns for the U.S. Senate.  Abraham spent almost $14.5 million on his 
campaign; Stabenow spent over $8 million on hers.  Both allocated over half of their 
campaign budgets to advertising, though both spent less than two percent of their budgets 
on grassroots campaign activities.  In the end, despite challenging a powerful incumbent 
who outspent her by over eighty percent, Stabenow won the seat by less than 70,000 
votes out of over 4 million cast. 
 Why did Stabenow win?  Certainly the character of Michigan’s voters had 
something to do with it.  So too did the news media, with its coverage of the campaigns 
and the issues both in Michigan and in the country as a whole.  But most would argue 
that the campaigns also played a large role in determining who would win the U.S. 
Senate seat from Michigan.  But which campaign?  Was Stabenow’s campaign 
exceptional, despite being outspent?  Did Abraham’s campaign underperform, especially 
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for an incumbent?  Did the presidential race and the fact that Michigan was a 
battleground state make a difference?  And what about the efforts of the state parties? 
 This dissertation looks at these questions.  Broadly speaking, this dissertation 
addresses two central research topics:  how parties and candidates come together to create 
campaigns, and whether those campaigns have effects on individual voters and/or 
aggregate outcomes.  Political scientists have written extensively in these areas, with 
answers varying depending on the type of campaign being studied and the effects being 
sought.  Despite the volume of existing research, numerous questions remain as to the 
nature of political campaign activity and the possible effects of that activity on American 
voters.  In this dissertation I answer some of those questions and shed light on the 
continuing debate in the literature. 
 To address these questions, I analyze Congressional elections from 1992 to 2002.  
The analyses in this dissertation utilize data on how candidates allocate resources within 
their campaigns for U.S. House and U.S. Senate.  In five election cycles that fall within 
the time frame1, I examine over four thousand campaigns.  The data include over three 
thousand House campaigns and over three hundred Senate campaigns.  Furthermore, the 
data include almost two thousand challengers, two thousand incumbents, and over five 
hundred open seat candidates.  All told, these campaigns comprise over one hundred and 
fifty Senate races and nearly two thousand House races. 
 The analyses in this dissertation also include data on political party efforts on 
behalf of their candidates.  Party organizations become involved in campaigns through 
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hard money contributions to candidates and through soft money spending traditionally 
done by state party organizations.  Why the effects of the former can be accounted for by 
records of candidate expenditures, the soft money used by state party organizations to 
educate and mobilize voters can have a large impact on the Congressional races in their 
states.  In order to capture these effects, I also use data from the Federal Election 
Commission to track the campaign spending of state party organizations for the 
Republican and Democratic Parties. 
 The debate regarding the nature of campaigns and the magnitude of campaign 
effects continues, but three significant areas of inquiry remain.  First, what activities do 
candidate campaigns perform?  Does campaign activity vary between Senate and House 
campaigns, between incumbent, challenger, and open seat campaigns, between 
Democrats and Republican?  How has candidate campaigning changed over the course of 
the 1990s? 
 Second, what kinds of campaign activity are party organizations performing?  Are 
these activities limited to the traditional functions performed in service to the candidates, 
or are parties pursuing their own goals through engaging in activities independent of the 
candidates?  How have changes in campaign finance, particularly rulings on soft money 
spending that took effect in the middle of the decade, changed the nature of party 
campaigning?  And if so, how did candidates respond to a new era of party involvement 
in campaigns? 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Actually, there are six election cycles between 1992 and 2002, but 1996 will be omitted from this analysis 
because resource allocation data are not available for that year. 
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 Third, how exactly do modern political campaigns influence electoral behavior?  
As campaigns engage in more and different types of activity, what activities are crucial to 
affecting the behavior of voters and the outcomes of elections?  Further, since parties are 
increasingly active campaigners, is it useful to search for campaign effects without 
considering the efforts put forth by the parties?  And finally, where do campaign effects 
exist?  Do campaigns have an impact in competitive races or in blowout ones (or both)?  
Can they affect turnout by mobilizing voters, or do they affect vote choice by persuading 
them?  What aspects of the campaign are crucial to mobilization and/or persuasion 
effects? 
 The study of campaigns and their effects has become vitally important over the 
last decade.  The increasing polarization in the United States has had a tremendous 
impact on campaigns.  In many areas, the underlying demographic and partisan 
characteristics of the voters result in uncompetitive elections that, in turn, produce weak 
campaigns on the part of both the favored candidate and the underdog.  With weaker 
campaigns, voters will not receive a thorough airing of the issues, which impedes 
democratic deliberation and hinders accountability.  Furthermore, a favored candidate in 
an uncompetitive race would be free to pursue secondary goals such as providing 
donations to other candidates, thus having an impact on elections outside his or her 
district.  Yet in the few remaining competitive districts, the efforts of the campaigns can 
mean the difference between victory and defeat, and in a nation closely divided by party, 
victory in a few key districts or states can mean the difference in the battle for control of 
Congress or the White House. 
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 This study also coincides with renewed scholarly interest in campaigns and 
campaign effects.  Recent research has revealed important campaign effects associated 
with television advertising, campaign events, and grassroots mobilization activities.  
Building on this recent work, this study continues the search for campaign effects by 
employing a unique framework (looking at the combined efforts of candidate and party) 
and innovative data that span a broad (but recent) period of American political history. 
 This period (1992-2002) is important not only because it is recent, but also 
because it covers several election cycles in which the nature of campaigning changed.  
Parties and candidates were forced to innovate as the context in which they ran 
campaigns changed.  For example, the nature of campaign finance changed dramatically 
over the course of the 1990s.  By the end of the decade candidates were able to raise 
much more money (even controlling for inflation), and parties made use of favorable 
changes in campaign finance rules2 to move beyond their service roles to become 
independent players in campaigns.  In addition, changes in the legal context of elections 
forced candidates and parties to adapt.  Motor voter legislation made it easier for many 
citizens to register to vote; campaigns then had to adjust their mobilization strategies to 
account for these additional (traditionally marginal) potential voters.  Redistricting 
following the 1990 and 2000 censuses also forced candidates to adapt to different 
constituencies.  Finally technological changes altered the media environment in which a 
campaign takes place.  The rise of cable and satellite television, talk radio, and the World 
                                                        
2 Two events in 1996 paved the way for parties to become more influential players in elections.  One, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee made it 
possible for parties to use hard money on independent expenditures without violating coordinated 
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Wide Web forced candidates and parties alike to respond with new and innovative 
campaign strategies. 
 These changes in campaigns that occurred during the 1990s are worth 
documenting because campaigns have such a large impact on American democracy.  
Campaigns provide information to voters and foster deliberation.  They also serve as 
vehicles for democratic accountability, allowing voters to remove poorly performing 
incumbents and to replace them with new leadership.  From another point of view, 
studies of campaigns speak to the behavior and motivations of those elites who would 
serve in public office.  But fundamentally, the study of political campaigns provides 
scholars with insight into how campaigns operate.  By studying campaigns we can see 
how elites seek to affect electoral outcomes through the mobilization and persuasion of 
voters.  The results of this process, then, are manifested in which elites are elected to 
public office and therefore which groups in society will be represented and which public 
policies will be pursued. 
 
Outline of this Dissertation 
 Following this brief introduction, the second chapter develops the theory behind 
this dissertation project.  While motivated by gaps in the existing literature, this 
dissertation builds on previous empirical findings as it constructs a new theory of 
campaigns and campaign effects.  This theory leads to specific, testable hypotheses about 
                                                                                                                                                                     
expenditure limits.  Two, the FEC issued an advisory opinion allowing parties to engage in issue advocacy 
funded with a mix of hard and soft money. 
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campaigns and elections, and those hypotheses are presented here as well.  In addition, 
the second chapter previews the data and methods employed in this dissertation. 
 Briefly, the data on candidate campaign organizations come from the Campaign 
Finance Analysis Project (www.campaignfinanceanalysisproject.com)3.  The CFAP 
analyzes campaign expenditure reports filed with the Federal Election Commission.  The 
product of the CFAP analyses is a dataset that classifies campaign spending into twenty-
six different spending categories, including eighteen related to campaign organization.  
The data on political parties come Federal Election Commission records of state party 
administrative spending.  These data contain records of individual expenditures made by 
the state parties that I have classified into categories similar to those used by the CFAP.  
Data used to test for campaign effects come from the American National Election Studies 
(for individual level analyses) and from various national and state election officials (for 
aggregate analyses). 
 The third chapter focuses on describing campaigns.  I begin by describing the 
structure and activity of candidate campaign organizations in the 1990s and how they 
vary over time.  I go on to describe the campaign activity of state parties and how that 
activity has varied over the course of the 1990s.  I also consider several multivariate 
models that explain why candidates and parties allocate resources in the way that they do. 
 In the fourth chapter I consider strategic behavior on the part of candidates and 
parties.  When creating a campaign, a candidate or party will certainly react to the current 
electoral context; the opposing candidate or party will do so as well, so one could say that 
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each side considers the other side’s behavior when allocating resources within a 
campaign.  In this chapter I go beyond that explanation of resource allocation to make an 
argument that candidates also consider the behavior of campaigns not involved in their 
particular races when allocating resources.  To that end, I consider several multivariate 
models of resource allocation that are rooted in the theory that candidates consider what 
their party is doing, as well as what top of the ballot candidates are doing, when making 
resource allocation decisions. 
 In the fifth chapter I turn my attention to analyses of campaign effects.  
Campaigns can have effects through advertising, through events, or through the efforts of 
the campaign organization.  I test for campaign effects in four different analyses.  The 
first two involve individual level models.  Using data from the National Election Studies, 
I create models that include campaign advertising and grassroots voter mobilization 
efforts for the campaign nuclei (party campaigns plus candidate campaigns), as well as 
individual level factors that affect electoral behavior.  I estimate these models to see what 
aspects of the campaign have an effect on the probability of turning out to vote and on an 
individual’s choice among candidates.  The third and fourth analyses are based on 
aggregate models.  Again using data on campaign advertising and the mobilization efforts 
of campaign nuclei, as well as aggregate measures of key control variables, I estimate 
these models to see if campaigns have an effect on district-wide turnout and on candidate 
vote-share. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Access to these data was made possible by support provided by Daron Shaw and by the Public Policy 
Clinic in the Department of Government at The University of Texas at Austin. 
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  The final chapter serves as a conclusion by reviewing the results from the 
empirical chapters.  I then discuss the implications of this research on the future of 
campaigning and on voting behavior.  Finally, this chapter presents prospects for future 
work on the topic of campaigns and campaign effects, including a call for the collection 
of more and better data on what campaigns are and what they do. 
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Chapter 2 – Theory 
 
 Election campaigns exist, arguably by definition, because the people who create 
them – candidates and parties, most notably – want to win elections.  The parties, 
candidates, and other individuals who participate may have other goals – sometimes more 
important goals – but on the whole their most important, shared goal is to win.  Thus, we 
may think of candidates and parties as rational actors.  More specifically, throughout this 
dissertation I assume that individuals are self interested, that they have hierarchically 
ordered preferences, and they engage in behavior that will help them achieve their most 
preferred outcomes. 
 This broad perspective leads to some specific assumptions about candidates’ 
behavior.  First and foremost, I assume that candidates are most concerned with winning 
(re)election (Jacobson, 1985-1986).  This is consistent with scholarship such as that of 
Mayhew (1974), who refers to candidates as “single minded seekers of re-election.”  
How they do so is a matter of some recent disagreement.  While much of the literature 
assumes that election-minded candidates are risk averse and therefore seek to maximize 
votes (e.g. Jacobson, 2001), a new perspective has emerged that suggests candidates seek 
to maximize the probability of winning in the face of uncertainty (Gerber, 2004).  Both of 
these perspectives accord with the assumption that candidates strategically allocate 
resources.  But, the idea that candidates attempt to maximize the probability of winning 
in the face of uncertainty fits nicely with the assumption that as candidates become more 
certain of victory, they will be more likely to use their (campaign) resources to pursue 
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goals other than election.  Such secondary goals include increasingly the likelihood of 
victory in future elections (Goodliffe, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Loomis, 1988; 
Fenno, 1978) as well as providing assistance to other candidates and/or party 
organizations in an effort to secure legislative majorities (Malbin and Bedlington, 2002) 
or to increase one’s standing in the institution (Heberlig, 2003; Sinclair, 1995; Cox and 
McCubbins, 1993).  In summary, candidates have preferences over a variety of goals and 
they allocate resources so as to maximize their expected utility across all of those goals. 
 The rationality assumption also leads to some additional, specific assumptions 
about the behavior of parties.  While a candidate is primarily concerned with maximizing 
his or her utility across a variety of goals (the foremost being winning the election), a 
party must attempt to pursue its own goals as well as those of its candidates in an effort to 
maximize the total expected utility.  Parties are institutions created by strategic politicians 
to help the latter pursue their own goals (Aldrich, 1995).  Thus, with the exception of a 
few small parties that seek only to influence the issue agenda (or perhaps influence the 
issue positions of the larger parties), it is reasonable to assume that parties consider other 
goals (passing public policy, for example) only after they have achieved their primary 
goal to have their members elected to office.  As a result, I assume that parties 
strategically allocate resources in order to maximize electoral success.  It is unlikely, 
however, that a party’s candidates will all win, so it remains an empirical question as to 
how a party goes about allocating resources to maximize the number of races its 
candidates do win. 
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 I assume that voters have preferences regarding election outcomes and that they 
will behave in ways designed to achieve their most preferred outcomes.  But this first 
assumption is tempered by a second, that voters are cost minimizers.  Voters may like to 
see particular candidates or parties elected to office, but they are not willing to bear high 
costs to achieve those outcomes.  Voters use this type of cost-minimizing behavior when 
they attempt to make decisions with minimal amounts of political information (Popkin, 
1991) or rely on parties to reduce the costs of participation (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 
1994). 
 
Rational Behavior Among the Elites and Changes in the Political Environment 
 Throughout much of the twentieth century, campaigns were dominated by party 
organizations, and candidates played little role in their own quest for office (Aldrich, 
1995).  Party leaders controlled nominations for office (Hershey and Beck, 2003; Bibby, 
1998), and party organizations alone possessed the resources necessary for voter contact 
and mobilization (Bibby, 1998; Merriam, 1923).  But by the 1960s the context of 
elections was changing.  Such Progressive era reforms as the institution of the direct 
primary and the adoption of civil service legislation had taken their toll on the power of 
the parties over nominations and patronage rewards for voter loyalty, respectively 
(Hershey and Beck, 2003; Herrnson, 1998b).  Reforms initiated by the Democratic Party 
further weakened the parties’ control over nominations and, hence, candidates (Herrnson, 
1998b).  In addition, technological change, most notably the rise of television as a 
medium for voter contact, but also the advent of relatively low-cost air travel and 
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advances in polling and voter contact, made it easier for candidates to reach out to voters 
(Foster and Muste, 1992). 
 As a result, candidates in the 1960s began creating campaign organizations that 
were distinct from the party organizations (Aldrich, 1995).  As candidates for office 
became largely self-selected (Ehrenhalt, 1992), nominated through direct primaries rather 
than through party conventions (Hershey and Beck, 2003), and elected by means of their 
own campaign organizations, scholars came to see this new context of elections as an era 
of candidate centered politics (Aldrich, 1995; Shively, 1992).  Partisan identification 
declined (Wattenberg, 1990) and candidates, rather than parties, became the mechanism 
by which voters came to understand politics (Wattenberg, 1991).  These transformations 
led some to proclaim the decline of the political party (Dalton, 2000; Wattenberg, 1990; 
Crotty and Jacobson, 1980; Fiorina, 1980; Broder, 1972). 
 Yet party elites were not to be left out, and beginning in the 1970s parties adjusted 
to the new era.  The Republican Party began developing organizations designed to 
provide candidates with the campaign money and services they would need to win 
(Cotter and Bibby, 1980; Herrnson, 1998b) and the Democrats did so shortly thereafter 
(Herrnson, 1998b; Cook, 1981).  The Democratic Party, which had inadvertently hurt 
itself in the late 1960s with reforms to the nomination process (Polsby, 1983), sought to 
reassert its power in nominations by creating superdelegates (Hershey and Beck, 2003).  
Both parties became more nationalized – the Democrats in an effort to reign in the 
diverse and frequently obstinate state and local parties, and the Republicans in an effort 
to survive in an era of Democratic dominance (Cotter and Bibby, 1980).  The parties 
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worked to integrate and strengthen their organizations at multiple levels (Huckshorn, 
Gibson, Cotter, and Bibby, 1986), and these efforts were reflected in more active 
organizations at the national (Cotter and Bibby, 1980), state (Huckshorn, Gibson, Cotter, 
and Bibby, 1986; Gibson, Cotter, Bibby, and Huckshorn, 1983), and local (Gibson, 
Frendreis, and Vertz, 1989) levels.  By the end of the 1980s, the parties had firmly 
established themselves in the new role as service providers to largely independent 
candidates (Hershey and Beck, 2003; Bibby, 1998; Herrnson, 1988). 
 A clear theme that emerges from this discussion is the ability of rational actors to 
respond to change.  New circumstances either force parties and candidates to adapt or 
present them with opportunities for innovation.  For parties, this has given rise to the 
“adaptive brokerage” model (Frendreis and Gitelson, 1993), or the view that parties 
respond to changes in the electoral environment by developing new capacities and 
altering the service roles they play.  In the 1960s and 1970s, changes in technology, the 
nomination process, campaign finance law, and party identification in the electorate 
drove candidates to strike out on their own in pursuit of electoral success while forcing 
parties to strengthen and assume a more subservient (yet still significant) role in 
campaigns.  And just as they did before, parties and candidates faced tremendous change 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  Again, change confronted parties on three fronts:  technological, 
contextual, and partisan. 
 Candidates and parties have had to adapt to numerous technological advances 
over the last twenty years.  Most significantly, changes in technology presented new 
methods for political communication.  Political talk radio (Fineman, 1993), electronic 
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mail and the world wide web (Davis, 1999), and numerous television channels – a result 
of the rise of cable and satellite television (Schnur, 1999) – have all provided elites with 
new ways to reach voters and citizens with new sources of political information.  
Advances in computing have also had an impact on campaign elites, as better hardware 
and software make campaign management and voter contact easier and less costly 
(Purnick, 2004; Bernstein, 1991). 
 The context in which campaigns take place has also changed.  Parties and 
candidates face an expanded electorate, as the National Voter Registration Act (Motor 
Voter) made it easier for people to register to vote (Knack, 1999; Knack, 1995)4.  
Congressional redistricting following the 1990 and 2000 censuses reduced the number of 
competitive seats for the House of Representatives (McDonald, Forthcoming).  Finally, 
changes in campaign finance rules altered the playing field for campaigns.  Specifically, 
Supreme Court decisions validating the use of agency agreements5 and party independent 
expenditures6 altered the way parties campaigned on behalf of their candidates (Sorauf, 
1998). 
 In addition, a trend of decreasing Democratic advantage in partisanship had 
profound consequences on the context of campaigns.  According to the American 
National Election Studies, Democrats had a 52-32 identification advantage in 1980; by 
2000 that advantage had diminished to 49-38 (Sapiro et al, 2003).  Other studies put the 
                                                        
4 While the NVRA has made voter registration easier, it does not appear to have increased voter turnout 
(Martinez and Hill, 1999).  As a result, parties and candidates must be even more meticulous with their 
persuasion and mobilization activities. 
5 Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27 (1981) 
6 Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604 
(1996) 
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advantage as low as 5 points (Taylor, 2004).  As a result of having a more even playing 
field for the first time in decades, parties and candidates were forced to work harder to 
mobilize partisans and persuade the all-important undecided voters. 
 These changes in technology, context, and partisanship have affected the way 
campaigns are waged.  Candidate campaigns are different, and the interplay between 
parties and candidate campaigns is evolving.  In the past five to ten years, students of 
campaigns have begun to address the implications of these changes, but these studies still 
lack a firm theoretical grounding for understanding how and why campaigns are put 
together and what effects they have on voters. 
 
Campaigns and Campaign Effects 
 The study of campaign effects has come a long way in the last fifty years.  At the 
birth of behavioral research in the 1940s and 1950s, scholars of campaigns were still 
looking to party organizations as the loci of campaign activity.  Early in this period, 
Cousens (1942) wrote of the “campaign” as (solely) the efforts of the party organization.  
Parties are also the recipient of campaigns funds and the source of campaign spending.  
Schlesinger (1965) developed the theory of the party organization as a nucleus, or the 
“collective effort devoted to the capture of a single public office,” (p. 775).  For 
Schlesinger, parties in the aggregate are the product of the relationships among the 
various party nuclei.  Even at the end of the 1960s, scholars still saw campaigning as 
primarily the responsibility of local party organizations, and it was assumed that 
17 
“prospective office-seekers… will coordinate their campaigns through the established 
party organs,” (Crotty, 1968, p. 252) 
 While some scholars studied campaigns by focusing on party organizations, many 
looked elsewhere for insights into campaigns.  Studies focusing on voters provided 
significant contributions to our understanding of campaigns.  Using panel studies 
conducted in Erie County, Ohio and Elmira, New York, scholars from the Columbia 
School assessed the impact of social characteristics and group identification on 
individual-level voting behavior (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Berelson et al., 1954).  These 
scholars broadly argue that voters’ opinions are shaped by “opinion leaders,” and 
exposure to opinion leaders varies depending on the social groups with which one 
interacts.  Yet these studies also show how the party-run campaigns influenced voting 
behavior.  For example, in 1948, many groups that were sociologically disposed to 
support the Democratic candidate moved from indecision to supporting Truman.  By 
emphasizing issues that appealed to Democratic-leaning groups, the Truman campaign 
activated their underlying predispositions (Berelson et al, 1954). 
 Instead of using panel studies, scholars from the University of Michigan found 
that partisanship – or a citizen’s psychological attachment to a party – could explain quite 
a lot with respect to voting behavior (Campbell et al., 1960).  Their description of the 
campaign, then, focuses on how voters perceive the campaign through the lens of their 
partisanship, thus affecting other attitudes (issue opinions, feelings towards the 
candidates) that in turn affect vote choice. 
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 It is interesting to note how these camps differ with respect to the role of the 
campaign.  With their emphasis on the role of communication in shaping voters’ 
opinions, scholars in the Columbia School were more likely to look to the (party-run) 
campaigns as the source of the messages that would be funneled through opinion leaders 
and eventually be perceived by voters depending on the latter’s social characteristics.  On 
the other hand, scholars with the Michigan School – with its emphasis on psychological 
factors – were less likely to see the campaign as central to the voting decision.  As the 
“socio-psychological” model of voting behavior triumphed over the purely “sociological” 
model, scholars could feel free to ignore the specific impact of campaigns and instead 
turned began to focus on party identification and other psychological factors that affect 
voting behavior.  Though campaign was important, its importance was manifested 
through behavior that could be predicted by individual-level attitudes; as a result, the 
efforts of the campaign appeared not to matter. 
 Later scholars, working well into the era of party decline/candidate-centered 
politics, continued to search for other factors that have an influence on individual votes.  
Retrospective evaluations of incumbent party performance have an impact (Fiorina, 
1981), as do economic concerns such as retrospective evaluations of the national 
economy (Markus, 1988) and perceptions of inflation and unemployment (Kiewiet, 1981; 
Key, 1966).  And while much work continued to look to the (now candidate) campaigns 
as possible explanations for voting behavior, many found that noncampaign factors 
accounted for the majority of individual votes.  For example, Holbrook (1994) finds that 
national conditions (such as presidential popularity or consumer sentiment) have a larger 
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impact on voting than do the efforts of the campaigns; Finkel (1993) finds the same thing 
for political predispositions such as partisanship and presidential approval.  Little or no 
room is left for campaigns to have an impact on either individual vote choice or 
aggregate outcomes (Holbrook, 1994; Finkel, 1993). 
 Despite the implications of the Columbia and Michigan findings that campaigns 
were critical to the impact of social groups and partisanship on voting behavior, the 
onslaught of scholarship indicating that votes could be accounted for without considering 
the efforts of the campaign prompted some to adopt a theory that campaigns had 
“minimal effects.”  According to this theory, campaigns are not important in explaining 
electoral outcomes because they inevitably create a balanced information environment 
due to equal funding (in the presidential case) and the fact that (presidential) campaigns 
employ the best possible people and use the best possible tactics.  While not explicitly a 
“campaigns do not matter” argument, proponents of minimal effects suggest that non-
campaign factors best explain voting behavior and that campaigns, though potentially 
having effects, are largely unimportant in explaining election outcomes.  But it should be 
noted that proponents of minimal effects only argued for its applicability to presidential 
campaigns. 
 Working from the minimal effects perspective, several scholars have developed 
techniques for forecasting the results of presidential elections using indicators measured 
months before Election Day (e.g. Campbell and Garand, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 
1992; Rosenstone, 1983; Fair, 1978; Tufte, 1978).  Using variables championed by other 
minimal effects scholars (e.g. party identification, retrospective evaluations, economic 
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evaluations) as well as other individual-level and aggregate indicators (presidential 
popularity, consumer sentiment), the “forecasters” have created models that can predict 
election results with great accuracy at earlier and earlier stages in the election cycle.  
Even when the forecasting models work poorly, as in the 2000 Presidential election, the 
modelers tend either to change their models to produce the right result (e.g. Bartels and 
Zaller, 2001) or to claim that they did indeed work, as when they predicted a Gore 
victory, and Gore did win the popular vote (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Tien, 2001). 
 But even in the midst of much of the minimal effects literature, there is evidence 
for campaign effects.  For example, Finkel (1993) argues that the majority of individual 
votes can be accounted for by considering partisan identification and presidential 
approval as measured before the conventions.  Yet Finkel concedes that his results 
support an activation model of campaign effects; Markus (1988) allows for activation as 
well.  Gelman and King (1993) argue that voters decide for whom to vote based on 
preferences enlightened by information learned from the campaigns.  These findings echo 
the work of the Columbia school, whose found in 1948 that Democrats were persuaded to 
come back to Truman by the Democratic Party’s use of class-based appeals (Berelson et 
al., 1954).  Indeed, campaigns that merely activate latent predispositions are still having 
an effect. 
 Furthermore, campaign effects in presidential elections are not limited to 
activating existing dispositions.  Individual-level data show that campaigns can have an 
impact on voting behavior.  Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) find that negative 
television ads demobilize voters, while Goldstein and Freedman (2002) find that the 
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negative ads mobilize voters7.  Presidential debates have been shown to affect vote choice 
(Holbrook, 1996; Geer, 1988), as do presidential campaigns more broadly through 
agenda-setting, framing, and priming (Petrocik, 1996). 
 Aggregate analyses have also found that campaigns can persuade voters and thus 
affect aggregate vote totals and public opinion.  The broadest indicator of campaign effort 
– campaign spending – has been shown to affect state-level vote share (Nagler and 
Leighley, 1992).  Several components of the campaign have also been shown to have an 
impact on voters in the aggregate.  Appearances (Herr, 2002; Shaw, 1999b) campaign 
events (Shaw, 1999a; Holbrook, 1994), national conventions (Holbrook, 1996, 1994; 
Campbell, Cherry, and Wink, 1992) and debates (Holbrook, 1996, 1994) all have an 
effect on voters’ preferences among candidates.  Finally, several studies have shown that 
presidential campaigns have an impact through agenda-setting, priming, and framing 
effects (Mendelberg, 1997; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody, 1996; Petrocik, 1996). 
 Some of the most interesting findings of campaign effects come from studies 
using experimental designs.  For example, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) use an 
experimental design to show that exposure to negative campaign advertising decreases 
the likelihood of an individual turning out to vote.  On the other hand, Clinton and 
Lapinski (2004) use experiments to show that negative ads do not decrease turnout in 
presidential elections. 
 Of course, the case for minimal effects generally was not applied to elections 
below the presidential level.  In the case of Congressional elections, campaigns have 
                                                        
7 Finkel and Geer (1998) and Wattenberg and Brians (1999) show that negative ads at least do not 
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considerable effects.  Again, the broadest indicator of campaign effort – total spending – 
has been a frequent predictor of aggregate voting behavior.  Several studies suggest that 
total spending has effects on voting that benefits House and Senate challengers 
(Abramowitz, 1991, 1988; Erikson and Palfrey, 1998; Gerber, 1998; Green and Krasno, 
1988; Jacobson, 1990, 1985, 1980, 1978); for incumbents, the evidence is mixed, with 
some arguing that spending has no effect or a negative effect (Feldman and Jondrow 
1984; Jacobson, 1990, 1985, 1980, 1978; Levitt 1994; Ragsdale and Cook 1987) while 
others show that it has a positive effect (Abramowitz, 1988; Erikson and Palfrey, 1998; 
Gerber, 1998; Green and Krasno, 1988).  Campaign spending also increases vote share 
for open seat candidates (Abramowitz, 1988).  In any event, there is general consensus 
that campaign spending exhibits diminishing marginal returns.  And at the individual 
level, campaign spending increases turnout (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985). 
 As for particular components of the campaign, television advertising has been 
shown to affect vote choice in Congressional elections, if only indirectly (West, 1994).  
The effects of negative advertising have also been explored in the context of 
Congressional elections, with many of the studies arguing for a demobilization effect 
(Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon, 1999; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; 
Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon, and Valentino, 1994).  Studying the role of 
information, Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau (1995) use an experimental design to show 
that Congressional campaigns provide voters with information that affects vote choice 
through its effect on candidate appraisals.  Franklin (1991) considers the role of strategy 
                                                                                                                                                                     
demobilize voters. 
23 
in Congressional campaigns, showing that the issues emphasized by Senate campaigns 
affect how clearly voters perceive the candidates on those issues. 
 Campaign effects are prevalent in other contexts as well.  In gubernatorial 
elections, campaign spending has been shown to have an effect on turnout (Patterson and 
Caldeira, 1983), while the negative advertising debate continues with arguments for 
demobilization (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995) as well as mobilization (Freedman and 
Goldstein, 1999).  Also in the context of gubernatorial elections, Leal (2001) shows that 
campaign spending has an impact on vote choice.  And in state legislative elections – 
where the candidates and campaigns are much less visible – there is a strong connection 
between campaign spending and electoral success, especially in larger states and states 
with professional legislatures (Cassie and Breaux, 1998). 
 Political parties are also a source of campaign effects.  Indirectly, parties affect 
electoral outcomes through the assistance they provide candidates.  Numerous scholars 
have documented the rise of parties in service to candidates (Hershey and Beck, 2003; 
Bibby, 1998; Aldrich, 1995); Herrnson (1988) describes the party as the “intermediary” 
between candidates and the resources they require.  And candidates report that party 
assistance is important and helpful (Hogan, 2000; Frendreis and Gitelson, 1996; 
Herrnson, 1986).  Parties have also become quite important financial players in elections 
(Dwyre and Kolodny, 2002) 
 But political parties can also have direct effects on voters.  The mobilization 
efforts of political parties have been shown effective, both through direct efforts 
(Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000) and through the “secondary” mobilization by activists 
24 
who are contacted by a party who, in turn, mobilize additional friends and family 
members (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992).  Generally speaking, party organizations help to 
reduce the transaction costs associated with participation.  Increased contact by a party 
organization helps individuals increase their perception of the benefits of participation, 
increase their perception of the probability of affecting the outcome, or decrease their 
actual or perceived costs of participation (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994).  With 
respect to vote choice, Buchler and LaRaja (2002) show that party campaigning increases 
vote shares for a party’s candidates for the U.S. House.  In addition, party efforts are also 
important in recruiting candidates to run for office, and the presence of candidates 
running for lower-ballot offices appears to increase vote totals for higher-level offices 
(Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz, 1990). 
 The most recent efforts in the study of campaign effects have focused finding 
campaign effects in the same places with new methods or with better data.  For 
presidential elections, Blunt (2001) looks for campaign effects at the individual level 
using polling data from commercial pollsters and finds that the campaigns activate pre-
existing attitudes in voters.  Hillygus and Jackman (2003) also look for campaign effects 
in presidential campaigns, but instead use individual-level data from Knowledge 
Networks, a private research firm that generates data through surveys administered to 
users who receive free internet service.  Using these data, Hillygus and Jackman find that 
debates and conventions have important effects on vote choice.  Shaw and Roberts (2000) 
assess the impact of campaign events in general using data from the Iowa Electronic 
Market’s Presidential Election Market.  With these data, Shaw and Roberts show that 
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campaign events have effects that are reflected in the prices traders are willing to pay for 
futures contracts tied to the outcome of the election.  Shaw (1999b) also uses innovative 
data in his assessment of the impact of television advertising on voting behavior.  Using 
gross ratings points purchased by the campaigns (rather than dollars spent on advertising, 
which does not really measure how often ads are shown in a market), Shaw demonstrates 
that television advertising does have a positive effect on statewide vote returns. 
 At the Congressional level, Goldstein and Freedman (2000) study the impact of 
television advertising on voting behavior using ad data from the Campaign Media 
Analysis Group.  With the CMAG data, which track each airing of a political 
commercial, Goldstein and Freedman show that television ads in U.S. Senate campaigns 
have an effect on vote choice.  Kahn and Kenney (1999) also address television 
advertisements, but in their case to address the mobilization/demobilization debate 
surrounding negative advertising.  Rather than using new data, Kahn and Kenney employ 
a better method – differentiating between negative ads that unfairly attack the opponent 
and those that justifiably highlight differences between the candidates – to show that the 
former demobilize voters while the latter mobilize them.  Kenny and McBurnett (1994) 
also use innovative methods in their treatment of the effects of campaign spending.  
Rather than using aggregate data, Kenny and McBurnett merge information on campaign 
spending with individual level data to show that campaign spending by both incumbent 
and challenger candidates for the U.S. House has an effect on vote choice. 
 Innovative research in other contexts includes work by Sides (2001) on campaign 
effects in the 1998 California gubernatorial election.  Using rolling cross-sectional data, 
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Sides finds that the campaigns primed voters to base their vote choices on information 
about the candidates rather than simple cues such as partisanship or opinions on the state 
of the economy.  Another example of campaign effects research that employs both better 
methods and better data is the work of Gerber and Green (2001, 2000).  In their studies of 
mobilization, Gerber and Green use field experiments to test the impact of campaign 
mobilization activities.  They find that nonpartisan applications of canvassing, leafleting, 
and direct mail increase turnout.  While they do not find the same effect for nonpartisan 
telephone calls, Imai (Forthcoming) uses statistical methods to “clean” Gerber and 
Green’s own data and finds that telephone calls increase turnout as well. 
 
A New Approach 
 To this point, much of the research on campaign effects is focused on presidential 
campaigns, with most of the attention being given to television advertising and campaign 
events such as debates and conventions.  What work that does focus on down ballot 
campaigns (especially those for Congress) tends to concentrate on the effects of total 
spending.  Even the most recent literature only departs from the mainstream in that it 
searches for campaign effects in the same places with new methods, or finds them in 
same places with better data. 
 Fortunately, there are several encouraging trends in the literature.  Scholars have 
worked hard to find campaign effects using different types of data and research design.  
Many studies rely on aggregate data while others derive individual-level from surveys or 
experimental designs.  In addition, scholars have identified campaign effects for both 
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turnout and vote choice.  For the former, scholars have shown how campaigns can both 
mobilize and demobilize; for the latter, scholars have provided evidence of persuasion as 
well as more subtle effects such as priming and activation.  Finally, scholars have 
examined both parties and candidate campaigns as sources of campaign effects (though 
the literature is still relatively scant for the former). 
 Despite these advances, there is still a great deal of room for improvement in the 
description of campaigns and campaign effects.  This dissertation builds on the 
momentum of the most recent research into the description of campaigns and campaign 
effects, but it is not merely an extension of existing analyses.  This dissertation addresses 
two significant issues that have not yet been fully accounted for in the literature. 
 First, the literature does not fully account for the breadth of activity that takes 
place in a modern political campaign.  Some studies of campaigns try to summarize the 
“total” campaign effort by using total spending as a proxy; unfortunately, the use of total 
spending is problematic because the failure to account for how campaigns spend money 
(i.e. not relying on money spent for actual voter contact) leads to biased result about the 
impact of campaign efforts (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994).  As a result, many scholars 
disaggregate campaigns in order to study their effects.  Much work has been done 
analyzing the impact of advertising or campaign events, but relatively little attention has 
been paid to the role of the campaign organization and the various activities in which it 
engages.  Much of this dearth of organizationally-focused research is a function of lack of 
data. 
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 Second, the efforts of candidates and political parties are not well integrated in 
studies of campaign effects.  Parties are no longer merely the money and service 
providers as they are often portrayed by scholars of campaigns.  Party campaigning has 
important implications for candidates; in those races where parties become involved, 
candidates are able to adjust their own campaigns so as to maximize their chances of 
victory.  This interaction between candidates and parties within the process of 
campaigning is understudied and undertheorized.   
 This dissertation addresses both of these concerns through analyses of 
Congressional campaigns in the 1990s and early 2000s.  I describe the breadth of 
candidate and party activity across multiple dimensions of the campaign:  overhead, 
fundraising, polling, voter contact activity, and donations to other candidates, parties, and 
groups.  This not only provides a critical look at late twentieth century campaign, but it 
also charts how campaigning is transformed over the course of a decade marked by 
technological and contextual changes.  Furthermore, I advance the search for campaign 
effects by considering the multiple dimensions of the campaign:  not only television 
advertising and campaign events, but also grassroots mobilization efforts.  In addition, I 
present a unified treatment of campaigns, considering the contributions of both party 
campaigns and the campaign organizations created by candidates.  Not only do both types 
of campaigns have effects on voters, but they also have effects on each other; this 
dissertation also innovates by describing the strategic interaction between parties and 
candidates in the context of a unified effort to capture elective office. 
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 To that end, let me first describe what a “campaign” is for the purposes of this 
dissertation.  Recalling Safire’s (1978) definition, a political campaign is “virtually all 
phases of an effort to win any kind of election, but most particularly the phase involving 
open, active electioneering.”  Important in that definition is the fact that Safire does not 
indicate that it is only the candidate that wages the campaign.  In fact, many actors wages 
campaigns; the most notable non-candidate campaigner is the political party.  As a result, 
efforts to describe campaigns and their effects would be incomplete without considering 
the contributions of both.  In order to capture the campaign efforts of parties and 
candidates alike, I rely on Schlesinger’s (1994, 1965) conception of the campaign as a 
“nucleus,” or the systematic effort to capture a single office.  In most races in the United 
States, both the candidate’s efforts and the party’s efforts (as well as efforts by other 
actors) form this nucleus.  Yet each organization has different goals.  Only by looking at 
both – taking into account the differing strategies each will be guided by – will we 
generate a fuller picture of why parties and candidates behave the way they do and how 
the efforts of both have an impact on voters. 
 Although there have been few efforts to unify the parties and campaigns 
literatures, it is crucial to do so for several reasons.  Most importantly, parties are now 
crucial to U.S. elections.  Ironically, studying campaign effects in any other country 
would require a scholar to look at the efforts of the party organization.  It is only in the 
unique, candidate-centered context of the United States that scholars look for campaign 
effects exclusively from the candidates’ organizations.  But parties can no longer be 
treated separately in the American case.  Given the explosion of soft money in the late 
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1990s, party organizations are increasingly relevant and influential8.  Yet much of the 
parties literature focuses on either the services parties provide for candidates or the 
advertisements parties produce on behalf of candidates.  Little consideration is given to 
the fact that parties have their own goals – goals perhaps divergent with the goals of 




 But first let us consider the candidate’s campaign.  As discussed above, I assume 
that candidates are strategic politicians (Jacobson, 1985-1986) who are most concerned 
with winning an election.  Since they are only concerned with their own races, they do 
not face the same resource allocation decisions faced by the parties (as well as the 
presidential candidates).  Yet they do face the issue of resource allocation in terms of how 
to spend their money.  Even the most successful candidates possess finite resources, and 
the key to electoral success is the strategic allocation of those finite resources among 
various campaign activities. 
 Much of the resource allocation literature has focused on the case of presidential 
campaigns.  Furthermore, most of this work is more appropriately characterized as 
studies of the geographical allocation of resources.  Like parties, presidential candidates 
face a campaign waged in multiple districts, so they have to make decisions concerning 
where to spend money as well as a how to spend those resources.  Generally, presidential 
                                                        
8 Parties raised more money during the 2004 campaign than in any prior campaign (Federal Election 
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candidates will allocate resources to states where the race will be close or will the 
outcome may be pivotal to the overall election outcome (Nagler and Leighley, 1992).  
More to the point, Bartels (1985) differentiates between instrumental resources (those 
vital to winning votes) and ornamental resources (those less important to winning votes), 
arguing that the former are distributed to the more populous states while the latter are 
distributed more broadly.  Other work that considers the allocation of resources vis-à-vis 
population addresses the “rule” for the distribution of resources; Brams and Davis (1975, 
1974) argue that resources are allocated based on a state’s electoral votes take to the 3/2’s 
power9, a result supported by Owen (1975). 
 But all candidates face the question of how to allocate their resources – that is, 
what to spend their money on.  Rather than relying on Bartels’s (1985) distinction 
between instrumental and ornamental resources, I instead adopt a theory of organizational 
dimensionality proposed by several scholars of political parties.  Writing in the 1980s, 
researchers with the Party Transformation Study surveyed political parties with an eye 
toward countering the “party-in-decline” literature with a story of strengthening party 
organizations (Cotter et al, 1984; Gibson et al. 1985, 1983).  These scholars used their 
survey data to establish a “party organizational strength” score.  Organizational strength, 
in turn, was the product of two dimensions:  the infrastructure needed to conduct electoral 
“business” (“organizational complexity”) and the capacity to persuade and mobilize 
voters (“programmatic capacity”).  Organizational complexity variables include 
permanent staffing, formal structure, formal budget, permanent existence (telephone and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Commission, 2004).  As a result, parties look to remain relevant and influential players in American 
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physical headquarters), and regular activity during both campaign and noncampaign 
periods.  Programmatic capacity variables include formation of campaign strategy, 
candidate recruitment, campaign activity10, patronage involvement, and effectiveness of 
precinct-level organizations. 
 This classification scheme can easily be adapted toward the study of candidate 
campaigns, which must also have the infrastructure necessary to contest an election and 
the wherewithal to contact, persuade, and mobilize voters.  Particular components of the 
latter dimension are easy to identify:  persuasion activities (television and radio 
advertising, in particular), mobilization activities (direct mail, canvassing and other 
volunteer efforts, telephone call), and other activities designed to reach voters 
(constituent gifts and entertainment, donations to local groups).  On the other hand, 
components of the “infrastructure” necessary to wage a campaign include the campaign 
organization, the fundraising apparatus, and information/polling operation.  Obviously, 
the strength of many of these individual components bears on the strength or productivity 
of the other components.  Broadly speaking, campaigns must possess sufficient 
infrastructure to make possible campaign output. 
 As one might expect, candidates would prefer to allocate a larger proportion of 
resources to components of the campaign designed to mobilize and persuade voters while 
minimizing the allocation toward campaign overhead and other features that do not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
elections despite the elimination of soft money following the 2002 campaign. 
9 See Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook (1975) for a different perspective. 
10 Many measures go into their campaign activity variable.  Among them are distributing literature, 
arranging campaign events, contributing money, telephoning voters, buying advertisements in the media 
(newspaper, television, radio, billboard), distributing posters/yard signs, distributing news releases, mailing 
literature to voters, conducting registration drives, and conducting door-to-door voter contact. 
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directly bear on winning the election.  Previous research tends to bear out this logic.  In 
their study of U.S. House races in 1978, Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) find that 
candidates spend about a third of their budgets on printing and around a quarter of their 
budgets on television advertising.  More recently, U.S. Senate candidates in the early 
1990s allocated over half of their budgets to voter contact activities while allocating 
between 20 and 25 percent of their budgets to both fundraising and overhead 
(VanHeerde, 2001).  For U.S. House campaigns, Herrnson (1998a) finds that candidates 
allocate three-quarters of their budgets to voter contact (including 18 percent to television 
advertisements, 14 percent to other advertisements, 18 percent to direct mail, and nearly 
25 percent to other voter contact activity) and only 18 percent to overhead. 
 While these empirical findings lend support to the theory that campaigns are 
organized around two dimensions, theory suggests there may be a third dimension related 
to a candidate’s pursuit of goals other than election.  While I assume that no candidate 
will jeopardize his or her own election in pursuit of other goals, it is nonetheless plausible 
that a candidate who is sufficiently confident of victory may use the campaign to pursue 
other goals such as achieving power and prestige within the institution or helping the 
party achieve or maintain power (Heberlig, 2003; Malbin and Bedlington, 2002; Sinclair, 
1995; Cox and McCubbins, 1993).  This third dimension of the campaign used to pursue 
secondary goals would likely show up through increased use of donations to other 
campaigns and to party organizations.  Recent research explores this phenomenon, 
arguing that incumbents are likely to use contributions to Congressional campaign 
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committees when they have leadership positions and the ability to raise excess funds 
(Larson, 2004). 
 Several factors loom large as we explore candidate campaigns.  One crucial factor 
is the concept of competition.  As elections become more competitive, candidates devote 
even larger proportions of their campaign budgets to activities related to voter contact 
(Greenwood, 1974).  Another important consideration is geography.  In smaller districts, 
candidates may be able conduct more of their voter contact in person (largely with staff 
and volunteer labor), while in larger districts candidates will be forced to use direct mail 
and broadcast advertising to reach voters.  A third important factor is whether the 
campaign is for the House or the Senate.  Senate races have a higher profile, as voters are 
more likely to be aware of the race and more informed about the candidates and issues 
involved.  As a result, a campaign for Senate will have different needs regarding polling 
and voter contact than would a campaign for the House.  Fourthly, partisanship needs to 
be considered.  Democrats, with their tradition of grassroots organization, may tend to 
emphasize organizational development and personal forms of voter contact while 
Republicans, traditionally the better-funded candidates, may lean towards more 
expensive (i.e. electronic) forms of communication11.  Finally, time is a factor; more to 
the point, changes over the course of the 1990s suggest that candidates will be spending 
more over time (especially those in competitive races). 
                                                        
11 The 2004 election (and 2002, to a lesser extent) saw an unprecedented effort on the part of Republicans 
to engage in grassroots mobilization (Balz and Edsall, 2004).  Fortunately, the expanded timeframe of this 
study will permit me to assess more generally whether the expectation of a partisan difference in the use of 
grassroots mobilization is still warranted. 
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 In summary, this dissertation describes candidate campaigns through an analysis 
of resource allocation in recent Congressional campaigns.  I expect that candidates create 
campaigns that reflect three underlying dimensions – organization, activity (voter 
contact), and donations (secondary goals) – though the focus will be on voter contact and 
the extent of the donations dimension will vary based on race competitiveness.  Race 
competitiveness will also affect resource allocation more generally, causing candidates to 
enhance voter contact activities and perhaps rely on methods of voter contact that are 
geared toward persuasion rather than designed for mobilization.  The size of the district 
will affect the forms of voter contact employed, and the candidate’s party will affect not 
only voter contact but also organizational development. 
 
Party Campaigns 
 In the case of parties, I also assume that we are dealing with strategic politicians 
that have an overarching goal of winning elective offices in order to secure governing 
majorities (Aldrich, 1995).  But parties have goals beyond getting their candidates 
elected, such as creating and maintaining a viable organization and developing 
identification and support among voters.  And like candidates, parties possess limited 
resources, and thus are forced to target their resources.  As a result, parties face the “how” 
resource allocation decision in the same way candidates do.  But unlike candidates, 
parties must balance the desire for current electoral success (which involves decisions 
regarding what to spend money on and which candidates should benefit) with the need 
for the organizational and grassroots development that will make future success possible. 
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 As I did before, I will adopt from the Party Transformation Study scholars the 
idea that party campaigns manifest themselves in distinct dimensions.  But while parties 
are expected to be organizationally complex and programmatically active, I have no 
expectation that there will be a third dimension of party campaigns related to the pursuit 
of secondary goals.  This is because parties, in a candidate-centered environment (and 
unlike most other Western democracies) are not themselves on the ballot; their primary 
goal is to help candidates win elections.  However, I do have an expectation that the 
infrastructure dimension for political parties will be more extensive than that for 
candidates; unlike candidates, who only create organizations for the purposes of 
contesting a single election, parties maintain a permanent presence and thus require 
additional resources to maintain a viable organization. 
 In order to help candidates win elections, parties allocate resources to campaigns 
where they will do the most good.  Several authors have noted that the Congressional 
campaign committees, for example, target resources to close races (Dwyre, 1994; 
Herrnson, 1988, 1992, 1994; Kolodny, 1998).  Many have found that Republicans are 
more efficient at targeting resources to close races (Herrnson, 1988, 1989; Jacobson, 
1985–1986) while recent evidence suggests the Democrats are also efficient distributors 
of resources (Glasgow, 2002). 
 Yet parties have different types of resources to allocate.  Parties can provide 
candidates with hard money contributions; yet since these contributions are limited to 
relatively low levels, it might be logical to expect that parties distribute them fairly 
broadly.  Soft money, on the other hand, can be spent by parties in unlimited amounts for 
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issue advocacy and party building efforts.  Thus, one would expect that this money would 
be focused on races where it will do the party the most good. 
 To summarize, this dissertation describes party campaigns through an analysis of 
resource allocation by state parties in recent Congressional campaigns.  I expect that 
party campaigns reflect two underlying dimensions – organization and activity (voter 
contact).  Competitiveness will affect how prominent a part the party will play in any 
particular campaign nucleus, especially with the more fungible (and hence more 
valuable) soft money resources.  As for the nature of party contributions, I expect that 
most resources devoted to activity will focus on voter mobilization efforts, though as the 
decade of the 1990s progress I suspect parties will focus larger amounts of money on 




 While both the candidate and the party will contribute to the campaign nucleus – 
or systematic effort to capture the office for which the candidate is running – it is 
unreasonable to assume that each contributor will do so without considering the 
contributions of the other one.  Hence, members of the nucleus will act strategically to 
allocate their own resources in the best possible fashion given the resource allocation 
decisions made by the other member. 
 But members of the nucleus are not the only actors whose behavior will affect the 
decisions of the affiliated candidate and party.  Other campaigns are usually operating in 
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the same state or district, and their efforts must also be considered.  For example, 
extensive television advertising by a presidential campaign might make it difficult for 
down-ballot candidates to use commercials to get their messages across to voters; as a 
result they may divert resources from advertising to other forms of voter contact. 
 As a result, we would expect any particular campaign to consider what other 
campaigns in the area are doing when making resource allocation decisions – whether or 
not those other campaigns are contributing to the campaign nucleus.  In the case of 
candidates, they will look to their party as well as to other (primarily top of the ballot) 
campaigns when allocating resources to various components of their campaigns.  For 
instance, if the state party, the presidential campaign, and the Senate candidate are all 
engaged in large mobilization efforts, a House candidate would be free to move resources 
to persuasion activities and rely on the other campaigns to mobilize his or her supporters.  
In the case of parties, they too will consider outside efforts – primarily those of the 
presidential campaign in the state – when allocating resources, but given their permanent 
nature, we would expect little effect of outside campaigns on party resource allocation to 
overhead and fundraising efforts.  In summary, for two candidates otherwise similarly 
situated, if one resides in an area with extensive campaigning by the party and other top 
of the ballot candidates while the other does not, we would expect to see quite different 




 To some degree, the campaigns created by candidates and parties – and the 
strategic interaction between them – are interesting and important in and of themselves.  
But their significance also lies in the fact that they are designed to affect voting behavior.  
Voters perceive the campaign (here considered to be the efforts of the two campaign 
nuclei) and potentially act on the information received.  But voters perceive the campaign 
in light of the two goals he or she is trying to achieve:  securing his or her preferred 
outcome while minimizing the costs incurred in achieving that outcome.  To that end, the 
voter will “allow” many things to influence his or her behavior.  Those influences bear 
themselves out in a two-stage process.  First, the voter has to decide whether or not to 
turn out on Election Day.  If he or she decides to do so, the voter must then decide for 
which candidate to vote12. 
 Much of the literature already discussed attests to the fact that the campaign 
should have an effect on voting behavior.  But other factors influence voting behavior.  
District conditions such as the level of competition can create an environment that 
encourages or discourages participation.  Candidate characteristics such as candidate 
status, issue positions, and candidate quality often interact with other factors (most 
notably the campaign and individual attributes) to influence voting behavior.  The 
electoral context, including registration requirements, the ease of voting, and whether the 
election contains a Presidential campaign, can also influence the voter.  Finally, the 
                                                        
12 Many scholars argue that this is not a sequential process but instead a simultaneous process.  Namely, the 
turnout decision is made only in light of the vote choice options presented to the voter.  See Sanders (1999) 
for an example of an analysis that treats turnout and vote choice simultaneously.  In any event, whether 
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voter’s own attributes such as issue positions, candidate and economic evaluations, 
partisanship, and sociodemographic characteristics influence both turnout and vote 
choice. 
 All of these factors play a role in determining individual level voting behavior 
(and hence aggregate outcomes) and thus warrant inclusion as control variables in models 
of campaign effects13.  The question then becomes what specifically could one expect the 
campaign to affect in the presence of all of these controls.  Generally, the expectation is 
that the campaign will have an effect on turnout and vote choice to the benefit of the 
sponsoring nucleus.  More specifically, I expect that mobilization efforts on the part of a 
campaign nucleus will increase turnout, particularly among voters from the same party, 
as theory and previous research suggests parties focus their mobilization efforts on their 
supporters (Gershtenson, 2003).  With respect to vote choice, I expect that the persuasion 
efforts on the part of a campaign nucleus will be manifested in increases in aggregate 
vote share and increased probability of an individual voting for the sponsoring candidate; 
obviously, the latter effect will be most pronounced for individuals with weaker 
partisanship, as strong supporters do not need to be persuaded and strong opponents will 
be resistant to such advances.  Furthermore, I expect candidate efforts to play a larger 
role in the persuasion process than those of the party. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
turnout and vote choice are simultaneous or sequential does not affect the theory regarding what factors 
influence voting behavior. 
13 Specific expectations about the effects of the control variables will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 – Describing Campaigns 
 
 In the preceding chapter I discussed the theoretical basis for a study of party and 
candidate campaign organizations.  As it is their combined efforts that will influence the 
outcome on Election Day, it is important for scholars of campaign effects look to 
understand the interaction between the two and their respective and combined effects on 
the electorate.  But before I address these, it would be helpful to get a handle on what it is 
exactly that candidate and party campaigns are doing.  Do they perform the same 
activities?  Has the nature of their campaign activities changed over time?  And what 
factors explain variance in organizational strength and voter outreach.  It is to these 
questions that I now turn. 
 
Changes in Campaigns 
 The transition from party-centered to candidate-centered campaigns has been one 
of the most important developments in American politics in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.  Beginning in the 1960s, candidates took advantage reforms in the candidate 
nominating process (Schlesinger, 1994) and developments in technology (Foster and 
Muste, 1992) to seize control of their own efforts to capture elective office.  As a result, 
candidates began to raise money independently of the party and to create campaign 
organizations distinct from those of the party organization (Dodenhoff and Goldstein, 
1998; Jacobson, 1992; Wattenberg, 1991).  Parties subsequently redefined their role in 
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campaigns to act in service of their now independent candidates (Sabato and Larson, 
2002; Aldrich, 1995; Herrnson, 1988). 
 The consequences of this change have been significant.  With individual 
candidates at the helm, campaigns have become more personalistic.  Voters are presented 
with appeals that are less focused on the candidate’s relationship to institutions (with the 
possible exception of incumbents emphasizing their current service in office) and less 
focused on building broad coalitions.  Instead, each candidate searches for his or her 
“personal vote,” or the specific set of voters that will ensure the candidate’s victory.  The 
mechanics of this search often involve television advertisements and staged campaign 
events.  These appeals are typically a good deal less personal than the grassroots 
contacting that characterized party-centered electioneering. 
 There is, in fact, evidence that candidate-centered campaigning had a detrimental 
effect on voters.  Voters are increasingly subject to more pervasive (even permanent) 
campaigns (Ornstein and Mann, 2000; King, 1997; Blumenthal, 1980).  As a result, voter 
evaluations of campaigns are quite negative (Lipsitz et al., 2003).  Furthermore, the era of 
candidate-centered campaigning is coincident with a profound decrease in citizen interest 
and engagement in politics (Putnam, 2000) as well as a decline in voter turnout (Election 
Assistance Commission, 2005)14.  All of these conditions are troublesome if democracy is 
going to function effectively in the United States; negative perceptions of campaigns, 
                                                        
14 A linear trendline that summarizes voter turnout from 1960 to 2002 has a slope of -.0027 (that is, turnout 
is decreasing by .27 percent per year over the 42 year period. 
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decreasing interest, and declining voter turnout make it difficult for society to engage in 
meaningful policy debate and to select a truly representative government15. 
   It is not clear, however, exactly how much candidate-centered campaigns have 
contributed to this state of affairs.  Specifically, political science has not engaged in 
systematic empirical research on the nature of candidate campaigns.  Only through 
looking into what candidate campaigns actually “do” can we thoroughly assess the 
impact they are having on voters, elections, and society. 
 Previous research in this area has examined the nature and effects of the 
individual components of contemporary campaigns.  The ability of a campaign to spread 
its message through the electronic media is critical in an era when candidates have to rely 
on their own efforts to persuade and mobilize voters.  Shaw (1999b) shows that television 
advertising (the most common form of media campaigning) has an impact on aggregate 
vote totals.  Other scholars argue that television advertising has an effect on turnout – 
though they don’t agree on the nature of the effect (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon, 
1999; Freedman and Goldstein, 1999; Kahn and Kenney, 1999).  Campaign events also 
appear to have an impact on voters (Shaw, 1999a); events such as candidate appearances 
(Shaw, 1999b), televised debates, and political conventions (Hillygus and Jackman, 2002; 
Holbrook, 1996) allow candidates to reach voters through mediated coverage.  Further, 
studies of presidential campaigns show that the messages put forth by the candidates can 
have an impact on voters (again, via the media) through agenda-setting, priming, and 
framing effects (Mendelberg, 1997; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody, 1996; Petrocik, 1996). 
                                                        
15 Politicians, pundits, and scholars would like to believe that this story is overstated – and some evidence 
44 
 Where this research is lacking is in the systematic description of the campaign 
organization and the testing of its effects.  The campaign organization is the entity 
created by candidates that makes electioneering possible.  Television advertising, 
campaign events, debates, and message development (as well as many other features of 
campaigns) are all products of the campaign organization.  Yet research into the 
campaign organization itself is limited.  The reasons for this dearth of research are 
relatively straightforward.  One, data on campaign organizations are scarce.  Two, the 
characteristics and features of a campaign organization are hard to quantify; how does 
one measure how “big” a campaign organization is or how “active” it is?  Three, some 
scholars believe it unlikely that the campaign organization has much of an effect on 
voters.  These factors mean that campaign organizations are either ignored or measured 
through (overly) simple proxies.  In particular, among scholars of Congressional and 
state-level elections, assessment of campaign organizations has taken a back seat to 
analyses that use measures that serve as proxies for the organization:  campaign spending 
(Jacobson, 1990; Abramowitz, 1988; Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985; Patterson 
and Caldeira, 1983) and candidate quality (Squire, 1991; Jacobson, 1980) – the latter on 
the assumption that “quality” candidates are better able to constitute a campaign 
organization. 
 Yet it is important for scholars to focus on campaign organizations.  Recent 
research suggests that the efforts put forth by organizations can have significant effects 
on electoral behavior.  Innovative field experiments by Alan Gerber and Donald Green 
                                                                                                                                                                     
suggests that some of these trends have reversed following September 11th, 2001 (Putnam, 2002). 
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suggest that organizational efforts can increase voter turnout (Green, Gerber, and 
Nickerson, 2003; Gerber and Green, 2001, 2000).  And while Gerber and Green’s work 
has focused on nonpartisan appeals, research into the efforts of party organizations 
suggest that their efforts also have effects on turnout (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994; 
Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985). 
 Simultaneously, parties and candidates are beginning to “rediscover” the 
campaign organization and the shoe-leather techniques of an earlier era, enhanced with 
advances in technology  (Balz and Allen, 2003; Nagourney, 2002).  For example, in 2004 
the Bush campaign and the Republican National Committee used the Internet to recruit 
and deploy volunteers.  Moreover, they created mobilization strategies that incorporated 
early voting programs and a “72 Hour” plan for Election Day get-out-the-vote drives 
(Balz and Allen, 2003).  In addition, both parties are using technological developments to 
aid in the development of a vote-getting organization and in its implementation.  For 
instance, voter list software allows the parties to create profiles – including political, 
demographic, consumer, and personal data – of individuals that can drive email, phone, 
and direct mail efforts for both fundraising and mobilization (Theimer, 2003).  This 
renaissance of interest both on the part of scholars and practitioners suggests that 




Studying Campaign Organizations 
 In focusing on the organizations created by candidates and parties in pursuit of 
electoral success, this study seeks to build on previous research into campaigns and to 
address oversights in the literature.  Specifically, this study looks to answer several 
questions about campaign organizations:  what do they look like?  how do candidate 
campaign organizations vary by party, by type of election, over time, and by candidate 
type?  how are party campaigns different from those created by candidates?  what factors 
explain why candidates and parties allocate resources the way that they do?  It is clear 
that campaigns are changing, and research into the most recent campaigns is necessary to 
understand their role in contemporary elections. 
 To that end, I make use of unique data.  I collected data on candidate campaigns 
from the Campaign Finance Analysis Project, a subscription-based web site that tracks 
contributions to and expenditures from the campaigns of candidates for federal office16.  
The specific data for this project are campaign spending totals for candidates for federal 
office (U.S. House and U.S. Senate) in 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 200217.  These data 
include all campaign expenditures for each two-year election cycle.  For the elections 
under consideration, the CFAP data cover 3572 candidate campaigns, including 3232 
U.S. House candidates and 340 U.S. Senate candidates. 
 To produce these data, the CFAP obtains campaign expenditure reports from the 
Federal Election Commission and categorizes campaign spending into twenty-seven 
                                                        
16 Available at http://www.campaignfinanceanalysisproject.com. 
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different categories18.  These categories are then grouped into eight major spending 
categories.  Two of these major categories involve expenditures related to voter contact:  
advertising, which includes electronic advertising and advertising in other media 
(newspapers, billboards, etc.), and grassroots campaigning, which includes expenditures 
for such things as telephone banks, door-to-door canvassing, and voter contact mail.  
Three of these major categories (overhead, fundraising, and polling) include expenditures 
that are not related to direct voter contact but are nonetheless essential for the operation 
of the campaign.  Finally, three major categories cover expenditures not related to voter 
contact or campaign operations:  constituent gifts and entertainment, donations (to other 
candidates, parties, and other groups), and unitemized expenses (for those expenditures 
that the CFAP was not able to categorize). 
 Data on party campaigns are also from the Federal Election Commission, but 
required significant original cleaning and sorting.  The FEC requires political parties to 
file reports accounting for their administrative expenses.  In this chapter I make use of 
data on the administrative expenditures of state party organizations between 1992 and 
2002.  For each two-year election cycle, state parties keep a record of expenses that bear 
on elections involving federal candidates.  These administrative expenses are paid for 
with a mixture of hard and soft money in accordance to established ratios (FEC, 1991, 
esp. Appendix 6).  For the six election cycles covered in the data, state parties reported 
1,552,917 unique expenditures that constitute 127,614 different expenditure types. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
17 The CFAP has not made available data for the 1996 elections.  Also, the data from 2002 include only 
Senate candidates. 
18 For more information, see Fritz and Morris (1992). 
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 To render these data comparable to the candidate data, I have recoded the 
administrative expenditures into the twenty-seven categories as described in Fritz and 
Morris (1992), producing spending totals for each category of campaign expense.  As 
with candidate campaigns, these twenty-seven categories reflect eight major categories of 
campaign spending, two of which involve voter contact (advertising, grassroots 
campaigning), three of which relate to organizational operations (overhead, fundraising, 
polling), and three of which do not directly deal with campaigning (constituent gifts and 
entertainment, donations, and unitemized spending).  However, I omit from my analyses 
the data on constituent gifts and entertainment and donations to candidates, parties, and 
other groups.  Practically speaking, these types of expenditures are quite infrequent in the 
administrative spending data and account for a tiny share of the total spending.  
Furthermore, any data on donations to candidates or other party organizations would be 
reflected in the recipient’s expenditure totals, and including them here would be double 
counting. 
 These spending data are particularly useful because they encompass everything on 
which candidates and parties spend money.  Much of the literature fails to account for of 
the breadth of campaigns in their activity and organization, an oversight that can lead to 
incorrect inferences about the impact of campaigns on electoral behavior (Ansolabehere 
and Gerber, 1994).  In addition, these data capture the lion’s share of party campaign 
expenditures.  Legally speaking, any state party campaign activity that might bear on a 
federal election (which includes all of the candidates included in this analysis) must be 
reported to the FEC and will appear in the administrative spending files.  Furthermore, 
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during the 1990s national party organizations began transferring large sums of money to 
state party organization to take advantage of more favorable hard money/soft money 
spending ratios available to the state parties (Dwyre and Kolodny, 2002), thus providing 
additional assurance that these data yield an accurate picture of the party’s campaign. 
 In addition to the expenditure data for candidates and parties, I make use of data 
on candidate status, district competitiveness, district size (in terms of both people and 
land area), and yearly inflation.  The latter, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
was used to adjust the campaign spending data for earlier years to constant 2002 dollars.  
Other pieces of data were collected from various sources and are described fully in 
Appendix A. 
 With these data, I focus on how campaign expenditures vary.  But this initial pass 
at the data is more than just a look at campaign spending.  Studies that only consider total 
campaign spending miss the fundamentally strategic nature of campaign resource 
allocation.  Some candidates may decide to create relatively weak organizations in terms 
of structure and activity, focusing instead on creating an organization that can develop 
relationships with other groups (party committees, campaigns, constituent groups).  Other 
candidates may be engaged in competitive races and will focus the strength of their 
organizations on voter contact.  And many candidates who do not stand a chance of 
winning will not create campaign organizations at all.  Similarly, political parties in 
competitive states will allocate more resources to voter contact while those facing less 
competitive environments may focus resources on organizational development.  Only by 
looking at how campaign money is spent can we fully understand how and why 
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 With respect to total spending, previous research – as well as logic – leads us to 
several straightforward expectations.  First, one would expect campaign spending to 
increase over time (Sorauf, 1995).  The increasing cost of communication suggests that 
campaigns will spend more over the course of the 1990s.  Second, one would expect 
more spending by incumbents than challengers (Sorauf, 1995; Goldenberg and Traugott, 
1984).  Not only do incumbents enjoy fundraising advantages, but many also enjoy the 
benefit of having cash-on-hand from previous campaigns.  As for open seat candidates, 
given that open seat races are traditionally more competitive than incumbent versus 
challenger races, one would expect that these candidates’ expenditures would look more 
like those of incumbents than those of challengers.  Third, one would expect more 
spending in U.S. Senate campaigns than in those for the U.S. House.  This expectation 
conforms to logic – Senate elections encompass larger constituencies, thus requiring 
more spending – as well as previous findings (Herrnson, 1998a).  Finally, one would 
expect more spending from Republican candidates than from Democratic ones 
(controlling for candidate status).  Previous research into U.S. House campaigns reports 
this Republican spending advantage (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984), and Republican 
fundraising advantages throughout the 1990s (Wilcox, 2002) make it likely that 
Republican campaigns will spend more. 
51 
 Expectations for parties are similarly straightforward.  Given the parties’ success 
at fundraising (FEC, 2001) as well as a trend for national party committees to transfer 
funds to state and local parties, one would expect increased campaign spending by state 
parties over time.  In addition, the traditional Republican advantage in fundraising should 
manifest itself as increased spending by Republican state parties (Aldrich, 2000). 
 Data on campaigns for U.S. House and U.S. Senate in the 1990s bear out some of 
these expectations.  Table 3-1 presents total spending for candidate campaigns over the 
five elections in question.  Total spending19 among all three types of House candidates 
increases over the entire timeframe, though the difference in spending between 1992 and 
2000 is statistically significant for incumbents and open seat candidates only20.  The 
magnitude of the increase is far greater for open seat candidates than for incumbents; 
while incumbent spending increased fourteen percent, spending by open seat candidates 
grew by over 125 percent.  This finding is probably a result of a closely divided House of 
Representatives that became even more closely divided over the course of the decade, 
with the result being that the competitive open seat campaigns became important for 
control of the chamber. 
                                                        
19 These, and all subsequent, spending figures are in constant 2002 dollars.  Inflation adjustment was based 
on the Consumer Price Index as reported on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website 
(http://www.bls.gov/home.htm) 
20 In an independent samples T-test (assuming unequal variances), the 1992-2000 difference in spending for 
House incumbents had a T value of –2.363 (p<.05) while the difference for House challengers had a T 
value of –1.135 (p>.25) and the difference for House open seat candidates had a T value of –5.125 (p<.01). 
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Table 3-1 
Total Campaign Spending – Candidates 
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Cell entries are inflation adjusted total spending figures 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 Unlike House campaigns, spending in Senate campaigns remained largely 
stagnant with the exception of open seat candidates; differences in candidate spending 
between 1992 and 2002 were only statistically significant for open seat candidates21.  As 
was the case in the House, Senate open seat candidates finished the timeframe spending 
much more in their campaigns than they did only ten years earlier.  Between 1992 and 
2002, spending in open seat Senate campaigns increased by ninety percent.  Interestingly, 
                                                        
21 The 1992-2002 difference in spending for Senate incumbents had a T value of –.251 (p>.80) and the 
difference for Senate challengers had a T value of –.404 (p>.65), while the difference for Senate open seat 
candidates had a T value of –2.392 (p<.05). 
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open seat spending was especially high in 2000, though this figure is skewed by the 
atypical candidacies of Rick Lazio (R-NY), Hilary Clinton (D-NY), and John Corzine 
(D-NJ).  Even without these three outlying cases, however, the upward trend continues; 
open seat candidates in 2000 still spent over $5 million, up from $3 million in 1998. 
 For both House and Senate campaigns, two trends bear mentioning.  First, 
incumbents grossly outspent challengers, though the trend is for the differences to be 
decreasing slightly.  In House races, incumbents outspent challengers by almost 240 
percent in 1992 ($740,000 to $218,000); in 2002, the difference was still a hefty 220 
percent ($843,000 to $261,000).  For Senate elections, the differences are not quite as 
impressive, though still quite large.  In 1992, Senate incumbents outspent challengers by 
165 percent ($5.3 million to $2.0 million), while in 2002 incumbents spent 130 percent 
more than challengers ($5.1 million to $2.2 million).  Nonetheless, incumbents still enjoy 
large advantages in campaign expenditures. 
 The second thing to keep in mind is the trend for campaign spending among open 
seat candidates.  In 1992, spending by open seat candidates for both the House and 
Senate was approximately halfway between the spending levels for incumbent and 
challengers.  By 2000 (for House campaigns) and 2002 (for Senate campaigns), open seat 
candidates for both chambers were spending more than both incumbents and challengers.  
This trend is likely the result of the nearly equal partisan balance that has developed since 
1994 as well as the increased importance of each seat.  As more and more incumbent 
seats (especially in the House) become safe, both parties see open-seat races as the means 
for winning control of Congress. 
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Table 3-2 
Total Campaign Spending – Parties 
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Cell entries are inflation adjusted total spending figures 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 Data on total spending by state party campaigns are presented in Table 3-2.  In the 
case of party campaigns, the average state party organization had $1.4 million in 
administrative expenditures in 1992, a figure that rose to $5.5 million in 2000 before 
declining to $3.9 million in 200222.  This seesaw pattern clearly reflects the impact of 
presidential elections.  When looking at total spending among only Republican or 
Democratic party organizations23, the see-saw pattern generally applies except for 
Democratic spending from 1992 to 1994 and Republican spending from 1996 to 1998; in 
those cases, spending remained fairly constant.  What is more interesting is the fact that 
Democratic party organizations had higher levels of spending in four of the six years, 
including 2000 and 2002.  This seems to contradict the conventional wisdom of a 
Republican spending advantage (see Aldrich, 2000), though it is consistent with recent 
                                                        
22 This difference is statistically significant at the .01 level (T= -5.111) 
23 The differences in campaign spending between 1992 and 2002 for both Democratic (T= -3.656) and 
Republican (T= -3.606) are statistically significant at the .01 level. 
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findings of a Democratic advantage in soft-money fundraising (Dwyre and Kolodny, 
2002). 
 
What Campaigns Do 
 Campaigns go to great lengths to create organizations and to communicate with 
voters in an effort to do two things:  mobilize supporters who may not turn out to vote 
and persuade voters who may not support the candidate.  But an election takes place in a 
fixed amount of time, and candidates and parties are forced to go about their mobilization 
and persuasion activities with fixed resources.  Thus, campaigns are forced to make 
crucial decisions about how to allocate resources in order to maximize the chances of 
winning.  In presidential elections, resource allocation decisions are two-fold, one 
involving where (geographically) resources are targeted and the other involving how the 
resources will be used (on what component of the campaign).  In sub-Presidential 
contests, candidates do not have to make resource allocation decisions in terms of 
geography24, but candidates do have to make decisions about how to distribute resources 
within the campaign.  For parties, the national organizations clearly face a two-fold 
resource allocation decision, but state parties must only engage in geographic targeting 
with respect to direct contributions to candidates as well as coordinated and independent 
                                                        
24 Admittedly, House and Senate candidates in large districts also face decisions regarding where to allocate 
resources; however, this situation is quite different from the one faced by Presidential candidates.  
Congressional candidates run in a single district, so even geographic resource allocation decisions are made 
in the context of winning a plurality of votes in one district.  In other words, a Senate candidate in Texas 
may shift money from Dallas to Houston, but a vote won in Houston is equal to one lost in Dallas.  
Presidential candidates, on the other hand, run in fifty-one separate districts.  A Democratic Presidential 
candidate would want to allocate more resources to Florida than to California, as a vote won in 
(competitive) Florida is much more valuable to the candidate than the one lost in (solidly Democratic) 
California.  This makes resource allocation decisions much more difficult for Presidential candidates. 
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expenditures.  Yet these forms of spending account for a relatively small piece of the 
entire state party spending pie25, and the targeting decisions regarding administrative 
spending only involve how to spend the money. 
 To ascertain what “works” and where campaigns are headed, it is vital that we go 
beyond total spending to look at how campaigns allocate resources to their various 
organizational and voter contact components.  While candidates would prefer to allocate 
a larger proportion of resources to components of the campaign designed to mobilize and 
persuade voters, they are nonetheless forced to allocate resources to overhead and other 
features that do not directly bear on winning the election.  Failure to account for how 
campaigns allocate money to the various components of the campaign can lead to biased 
results about the impact of campaign efforts (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994). 
 It is again worth observing that previous research on campaign resource allocation 
has been largely descriptive.  In their study of U.S. House races in 1978, Goldenberg and 
Traugott (1984) find that candidates spend about a third of their budgets on printing and 
around a quarter of their budgets on television advertising.  As elections become more 
competitive, candidates appear to devote even larger proportions of their campaign 
budgets to activities related to voter contact (Greenwood, 1974).  More recently, U.S. 
Senate candidates in the early 1990s allocated over half of their budgets to voter contact 
activities while allocating between 20 and 25 percent of their budgets to fundraising and 
overhead, respectively (VanHeerde, 2001).  For U.S. House campaigns, Herrnson 
                                                        
25 For example, in 2000 Democratic state and local party committees provided $5.4 million to federal 
candidates in direct contributions, coordinated expenditures, and independent expenditures; Republican 
state and local party committees provided $3.8 million (FEC, 2001).  In contrast, Democratic state party 
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(1998a) finds that candidates allocate three-quarters of their budgets to voter contact 
(including 18 percent to television advertisements, 14 percent to other advertisements, 18 
percent to direct mail, and nearly 25 percent to other voter contact activity) and only 18 
percent to overhead. 
 While VanHeerde and Herrnson focus on Senate and House candidates, 
respectively, it is perhaps more instructive to consider resource allocation by type of 
candidate.  Data on resource allocation patters for Congressional candidates are presented 
in Table 3-3. 
 House and Senate candidates of all types allocate between 20 and 25 percent of 
their resources to overhead and around three percent to polling.  For other campaign 
components, such as advertising, grassroots campaigning, fundraising expenses, and 
donations, there is considerable variation between the two chambers and/or the three 
types of candidates. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
committees had administrative expenditures of nearly $350 million in 2000 and Republican state party 
committees had $345 million. 
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Table 3-3 
Candidate Resource Allocation 
 
Category All HR Sen 
  Inc Chal Open Inc Chal Open 
OVERHEAD 23.25 23.91 22.97 20.99 24.53 24.82 22.23 
Furniture and Office Supplies 1.61 1.39 2.07 1.35 1.27 1.52 1.08 
Rent and Utility Payments 1.72 1.70 1.95 1.50 1.21 1.54 0.97 
Salaries and Payroll Taxes 10.44 10.18 9.97 11.31 11.11 13.04 12.65 
Other Taxes 0.69 1.09 0.28 0.31 1.31 0.52 0.64 
Bank and Investment Fees 0.21 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.37 0.11 0.08 
Lawyer and Accountant Expenses 1.14 1.85 0.48 0.62 1.51 0.61 0.54 
Telephone Expenses 2.27 1.75 2.99 2.18 1.43 2.93 1.98 
Campaign Automobile Expenses 0.26 0.45 0.08 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.09 
Computers and Office Equipment 1.46 1.59 1.49 1.16 1.30 1.10 1.15 
Travel Expenses 3.13 3.09 3.37 2.20 4.18 3.18 2.96 
Food and Meeting Expenses 0.32 0.56 0.13 0.08 0.48 0.07 0.08 
FUNDRAISING 13.06 18.30 7.52 8.71 18.51 12.60 13.14 
Direct Mail 2.83 3.09 1.88 2.08 6.06 6.07 5.33 
Fundraising Events 9.94 14.94 5.49 6.47 11.20 5.89 6.96 
Telemarketing 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.16 1.26 0.64 0.85 
POLLING EXPENSES 2.35 2.49 1.90 3.03 2.56 2.17 3.00 
ADVERTISING 28.67 23.34 28.18 35.88 41.50 43.95 50.74 
Electronic Media Advertising 24.66 20.32 22.39 31.59 40.51 40.83 49.77 
Other Media Advertising 4.02 3.02 5.79 4.29 0.99 3.12 0.97 
GRASSROOT CAMPAIGNING 22.16 16.03 31.49 26.99 6.99 13.85 9.61 
Persuasion Mail and Brochures 12.39 9.60 16.59 17.16 2.62 5.71 3.43 
Traditional Campaigning 9.63 6.24 14.79 9.73 4.31 8.09 6.13 
Staff and Volunteer Expenses 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 
CONST. GIFTS/ENTERT. 0.80 1.71 0.03 0.10 1.07 0.02 0.09 
DONATIONS 5.24 11.33 0.45 0.45 3.64 0.25 0.21 
Same State Candidate Donations 0.60 1.33 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.02 
Other State Candidate Donations 0.75 1.70 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.01 
Party Donations 3.23 7.01 0.22 0.19 2.77 0.16 0.14 
Ideological Group Donations 0.21 0.43 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Civic Group Donations 0.45 0.87 0.12 0.14 0.38 0.03 0.04 
UNITEMIZED 4.47 2.89 7.45 3.86 1.19 2.34 0.98 
Number of cases 3298 1414 1147 404 137 130 66 
 
Cell entries are the percentage of total spending within each column 
 
 With respect to voter contact, Senate candidates spend between 50 and 60 percent 
of their resources on advertising and grassroots campaigning, as do House candidates 
(except for House incumbents, who spend only 40 percent).  Yet the ratio between 
advertising and grassroots varies between the two chambers, with House candidates 
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having a much more equitable allocation and Senate candidates heavily relying on 
advertising.  Also, as one might expect, House and Senate incumbents are able to allocate 
far lower percentages to voter contact than are challengers and open seat candidates, 
though in most cases these smaller percentages still amount to larger absolute 
expenditures.  Clearly challengers must focus more resources on voter contact in order to 
achieve name recognition and to persuade voters against the incumbent while open seat 
candidates allocate more to voter contact due to the fact that these contests tend to be 
more competitive. 
 On the subject of fundraising, incumbents of both chambers allocate nearly 
twenty percent of their resources to the search for more money.  Challenger and open seat 
candidates in both chambers trail behind in their allocations to fundraising, though it is 
interesting to note that Senate challengers and open seat candidates allocate roughly 
thirteen percent to fundraising while House challengers and open seat candidates allocate 
roughly eight percent.  The relative emphasis by incumbents on fundraising is clear – 
incumbents raise more money so that they can use the extra resources to pursue other 
goals, perhaps to scare off future electoral challenges (Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Epstein 
and Zemsky, 1995) or to spread that money around to fellow candidates, party 
organizations, or constituent groups. 
 In fact, resource allocation to donations and constituent gifts and entertainment 
shows significant variation between different types of candidates.  Generally speaking, 
challengers do not have enough resources to warrant large allocations to these 
components, and open seat candidates tend to be in more competitive races, thus 
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requiring that more funds be reserved for voter contact.  Incumbents of both chambers, on 
the other hand, tend to have less competitive races and can therefore allocate campaign 
funds in pursuit of other goals.  As a result, House incumbents allocate thirteen percent of 
their spending to donations and constituent gifts and entertainment (approximately 26 
times what challengers and open seat candidates do) and Senate incumbents allocate 
nearly 5 percent (approximately 16 percent more than challengers and open seat 
candidates).  These findings in general, and the data on incumbent donations to parties 
and other candidates in particular, reflect a desire among incumbents to use campaign 
spending as a tool for strengthening their support in their home districts as well as to 
curry favors with colleagues and party leaders (Hollihan, 2001). 
 Political parties also face important resource allocation decisions, but those 
decisions are structured by a context quite different from the one faced by candidates.  
While candidate campaigns only exist for a few months every two or six years, party 
organizations exist continuously.  As a result, parties are forced to allocate a larger 
percentage to overhead.  In addition, we would expect increasing allocations to media 
over time, particularly after 1996 when national party organizations began shifting 
resources to state parties in order to fund issue advocacy advertising (La Raja and 
Pogoda, 2000).  Previous research on party campaign resource allocation largely supports 
these notions.  La Raja and Pogoda (2000) find that state party organizations in the 1990s 
allocated between forty and seventy percent of their spending to overhead expenses, 
between fifteen and twenty percent to grassroots campaigning, and five to seven percent 
to fundraising.  Interestingly enough, they also find that state parties in the early 1990s 
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only allocated a small portion of their resources (less than five percent) to media; in 1996 
that portion jumped to over one-third before settling down to sixteen percent in 1998. 
 Data on resource allocation by Democratic and Republican state party 
organizations are presented in Table 3-4.  Over the course of the 1990s, state parties 
allocated slightly over half of their resources to overhead, around five percent of their 
resources to fundraising, and around one-third of their resources to voter contact, almost 
evenly split between advertising and grassroots campaign efforts.  Generally speaking, 
partisan differences were minimal – both Republican and Democratic state parties spent 
five to six percent on fundraising, about one percent on polling, slightly over fifteen 
percent on grassroots campaigning, and small sums on constituent gifts and 
entertainment.  The major differences occur in resource allocation to overhead and 
advertising.  For the former, Republican state parties allocate seven percent more than do 
Democratic ones.  On the other hand, Democratic state parties allocate around seven 
percent more to advertising than do Republican ones.  The Republican advantage in 
overhead is consistent with previous findings of strong Republican Party organizations at 
the state level (Aldrich, 2000) while the Democratic advantage in advertising is 
unexpected.  Overall, however, these findings are remarkably consistent with those of La 
Raja and Pogoda (2000). 
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Table 3-4 
Party Resource Allocation 
 
Category DEM REP ALL 
OVERHEAD 54.79 62.10 58.40 
Furniture and Office Supplies 4.30 5.42 4.85 
Rent and Utility Payments 4.33 4.48 4.41 
Salaries and Payroll Taxes 31.93 36.73 34.30 
Other Taxes 1.89 1.45 1.67 
Bank and Investment Fees 0.37 0.33 0.35 
Lawyer and Accountant Expenses 0.89 1.67 1.27 
Telephone Expenses 4.52 3.70 4.12 
Campaign Automobile Expenses 0.23 0.21 0.22 
Computers and Office Equipment 3.06 3.99 3.52 
Travel Expenses 2.74 3.15 2.94 
Food and Meeting Expenses 0.54 .097 0.75 
FUNDRAISING 4.86 6.25 5.55 
Direct Mail 3.27 4.28 3.77 
Fundraising Events 1.22 0.98 1.10 
Telemarketing 0.37 1.00 0.68 
POLLING EXPENSES 1.06 0.60 0.83 
ADVERTISING 19.17 12.36 15.81 
Electronic Media Advertising 19.02 12.22 15.66 
Other Media Advertising 0.15 0.14 0.15 
GRASSROOT CAMPAIGNING 17.17 15.77 16.48 
Persuasion Mail and Brochures 3.35 4.15 3.75 
Traditional Campaigning 13.50 11.36 12.44 
Staff and Volunteer Expenses 0.32 0.27 0.30 
CONSTITUENT GIFTS/ENTERT. 0.18 0.23 0.21 
UNITEMIZED 2.76 2.59 2.68 
Number of cases 256 262 518 
 
Cell entries are the percentage of total spending within each column 
 
Changes Over Time 
 The preceding discussion provides a general description of candidate and party 
campaigns in the 1990s and early 2000s, but within that timeframe there may be volatility 
in the resource allocation decisions of candidates and parties.  The fact that fewer and 
fewer Congressional seats are competitive means that candidates will allocate fewer 
resources to voter contact over the timeframe – though this applies more for incumbents 
and House candidates and less for challengers, open seat candidates, and Senate 
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candidates.  Furthermore, declining competition suggests increasing allocation to 
donations throughout the decade, especially for (House) incumbents.  For parties, 
increased fundraising throughout the decade (FEC, 2001), increased transfer of resources 
from national to state party organizations (Dwyre and Kolodny, 2002), and changes in 
campaign finance regulations that made issue advocacy attractive to state parties (Potter, 
1997) lead us to expect that resource allocations to voter contact will be increasing during 
the timeframe. 
 Data on resource allocation over time for candidates are presented in Table 3-5.  
For House candidates, spending on overhead declined in the 1990s, though most 
drastically for challengers and open seat candidates.  Between 1992 and 2000, resource 
allocation to overhead declined only two percent for incumbents, but for open seat 
candidates it declined five percent and for challengers the decline was seven percent.  
 Spending on fundraising for House candidates remained largely unchanged 
among challengers and open seat candidates while incumbents allocated increased their 
allocation to fundraising by three to four percent.  This slight rise in fundraising 
allocation among incumbents is understandable, given their desire to build war chests or 
to raise excess fund for distribution to other party and candidate campaigns.  On the other 
hand, the failure of challengers to increase fundraising expenses probably reflects a desire 
to maximize resources for voter contact.  The consistency of open seat candidate 
allocations to fundraising is unexpected, particularly considering the fact that these races 
tend to be more competitive and tend to involve candidates of higher quality. 
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 Resource allocation among House candidates to voter contact also varied 
depending on the status of the candidate.  As expected, the types of candidates who tend 
to run in less-than-competitive races (i.e. incumbents and challengers) reduced 
allocations to voter contact over the course of the decade while the open seat candidates 
who tend to face more competitive contests actually increase resource allocation to voter 
contact from 60 percent in 1992 to 66 percent in 2000.  The drop-off for challengers was 
particularly steep (from 45 percent to 33 percent), and this general trend certainly mirrors 
the trend of fewer competitive House races that emerged in the 1990s. 
 Finally for House candidates, resource allocation to donations26 matches 
expectations.  Namely, open seat candidates and challengers spend one percent or less on 
donations due to the fact that they need to allocate as much as possible to voter contact 
activities27.  The fact that the trend is stable over the course of the 1990s only reiterates 
how competitive open seat races are and how focused challengers have to be to make an 
impression on voters.  Incumbents, on the other hand, spent nearly eight percent of their 
campaign budgets on donations in 1992, and that figure increased to twenty percent in 
2000.  This finding certainly affirms previous suggestions that safe incumbents will use 
their campaign accounts to solidify support at home or to enhance their profile among 
party leaders or colleagues in the House (Hollihan, 2001). 
                                                        
26 This figure includes spending for constituent gifts and entertainment. 
27 One might expect that any spending on donations by House open seat candidates comes from those 
candidates running in safe districts.  This is generally the case.  The correlation between district 
competition and spending per 1000 voters on donations is -.164 (significance < .01), indicating that 
increased competition results in less money allocated to donations. 
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Table 3-5 
Candidate Resource Allocation Over Time 
 
Senate 1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 
Overhead      
Incumbent 26.80 22.87 26.65 21.67 24.75 
Challenger 29.22 23.75 25.72 22.14 17.09 
Open Seat 23.94 21.37 24.85 17.57 16.25 
Fundraising      
Incumbent 17.90 17.08 18.22 19.78 19.44 
Challenger 13.40 12.80 9.86 9.01 15.16 
Open Seat 14.35 12.48 11.56 12.19 10.51 
Voter Contact      
Incumbent 48.14 53.53 46.42 49.03 45.64 
Challenger 52.89 58.84 52.70 59.80 49.88 
Open Seat 46.84 50.03 59.86 66.06 69.99 
Donations      
Incumbent 2.77 2.61 5.32 6.16 6.37 
Challenger 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.64 0.29 
Open Seat 0.17 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.47 
House 1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 
Overhead     – 
Incumbent 24.97 23.46 23.82 23.47 – 
Challenger 22.93 20.67 15.98 15.87 – 
Open Seat 21.85 20.54 21.43 16.77 – 
Fundraising     – 
Incumbent 15.81 18.08 20.23 18.88 – 
Challenger 7.02 7.36 4.90 5.41 – 
Open Seat 7.81 9.26 9.38 8.41 – 
Voter Contact     – 
Incumbent 45.45 43.65 36.18 33.10 – 
Challenger 51.03 51.40 45.69 46.94 – 
Open Seat 60.35 61.98 59.58 66.27 – 
Donations     – 
Incumbent 7.57 8.56 15.07 20.08 – 
Challenger 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.44 – 
Open Seat 0.44 0.40 0.75 0.72 – 
 




 The story for the Senate is a bit more complicated.  With regard to overhead 
expenses, the trend over the timeframe is generally downward, but there was an up tick in 
1998 among all three types of candidates, and in 2002 incumbent Senators decided to 
push allocations to overhead to levels nearly as high as they did in 1992 and 1998.  
Closer scrutiny reveals that the true anomaly occurs among open seat candidates in 2000.  
Looking at the trend while keeping the Senate’s “classes” in mind, we can see that in 
1992 and 1998, incumbents and open seat candidates allocated similar levels to overhead, 
and while challengers allocated less to overhead in 1998 compare to six years earlier, that 
decline was only from 29 percent to 26 percent.  Looking at the candidates in 1994 and 
2000, we again see similar percentages allocated to overhead except for open seat 
candidates, who for some reason chose not to spend as much on overhead expenses in the 
latter year (though again the decline is only three percent).  These findings suggest that 
certain patterns of resource allocation may emerge based on the particular group of 
Senate seats that comes up for election in any given year. 
 Spending on fundraising among Senate candidates appears to be more volatile 
than does that for House candidates, but generally speaking incumbents spent similar 
amounts on fundraising throughout the timeframe (just short of twenty percent) while 
open seat candidates allocated slightly less to fundraising over the course of the decade.  
Senate challengers, on the other hand, showed a trend of declining emphasis on 
fundraising until 2002, when candidates increased the allocation to fundraising to fifteen 
percent, up from 9 percent in the 2000 election. 
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 For Senate campaign allocations to voter contact, the “matched elections” 
scenario that turned up in overhead spending is evident here for incumbents and 
challengers.  For some reason, the seats that are up for election in 1992 and 1998 exhibit 
lower levels of voter contact spending than do the seats up for election in 1994 and 2000.  
For open seat candidates, however, the pattern does not apply; open seat candidates are 
allocating steadily rising amounts to voter contact, as one would expect given the highly 
competitive nature of open seat races and the close partisan balance of the Senate. 
 Finally, the pattern of resource allocation to donations that existed for House 
candidates is also evident among Senate candidates.  Open seat candidates and 
challengers each allocate less than one percent to donations28, and that figure remains 
relatively constant between 1992 and 2002.  Incumbents, on the other hand, increase their 
allocations to donations, though the level of their allocations is still well below the level 
of House incumbents (in percentage terms). 
 Data on trends in resource allocation for state parties are presented in Table 3-6.  
With regard to these campaigns, trends in resource allocation lead to two broad findings.  
First, there appears to be an inverse relationship between spending on overhead and voter 
contact spending.  As expected, Republican state parties allocate a larger percentage of 
their budgets to campaign overhead than do Democrats throughout the period.  In 
addition, the percentage of the typical state party’s budget allocated to overhead 
                                                        
28 Contrary to the findings for House open seat candidates, those Senate open seat candidates who do 
allocate resources to donations do not seem to come from safe districts.  The correlation between district 
competition and spending per 1000 voters on donations is .132 (significance > .25), indicating an 
insignificant relationship between competition and money spent on donations. 
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decreases between 1992 and 2002.  However, the trend is not linear, as the percentage 
decreases in presidential election years and increases in midterm election years. 
 Interestingly enough, data on resource allocation to voter contact show that it is 
the Democratic state parties that are allocating a larger share of resources to voter contact 
than are Republicans throughout the period.  Perhaps more importantly, the pattern that 
emerges is the exact opposite of that for overhead spending:  the percentage allocated to 
voter contact increases between 1992 and 2002, and the non-linear trend shows increases 
in presidential election years and decreases in midterm election years. 
 While this is not firm evidence that one form of spending is being replaced by the 
other, it is highly suggestive that state parties emphasize voter contact in the high profile 
presidential election years by downplaying organizational development, and then return 
to party building activities during the midterm elections.  It should be noted, however, 
that even with this apparent shift in resources, overhead spending still accounts for a 
greater percentage of state party spending than does voter contact in almost all cases – the 
exceptions being the Democratic state parties in 1996 and 2000, when voter contact 
accounted for five to ten percent more of their budgets than did overhead, and in 2002 
when they allocated 46 percent of their budgets to both. 
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Table 3-6 
Party Resource Allocation Over Time 
 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Overhead       
Dem. 65.63 68.47 44.00 58.98 41.39 45.69 
Rep. 70.26 71.81 58.24 67.86 51.98 53.71 
Fundraising       
Dem. 6.14 4.51 3.25 4.76 5.28 5.37 
Rep. 5.87 5.04 6.51 5.65 7.22 7.12 
Voter 
Contact 
      
Dem. 23.23 22.64 49.11 32.16 49.75 45.90 
Rep. 19.93 19.80 31.17 23.19 37.87 35.68 
 
Cell entries are percentages spent on each component by each type of candidate in each 
year 
 
 The second broad finding is related to state party resource allocation over time 
deals with fundraising.  While Republican state parties appear to follow a pattern of 
fundraising expenditures that mirrors the presidential election / midterm election cycle, 
Democratic state parties inexplicably cut their fundraising expenditures in the first half of 
the decade before increasing them in the 1998, 2000, and 2002 election cycles.  The 
pattern for the Republicans is easy to explain – they tend to allocate larger percentages to 
fundraising in the presidential election years when interest is higher and therefore the 
potential return on investment is higher.  It is not clear, however, why the Democrats, 
who were allocating a higher percentage of their budgets to fundraising in 1992, cut 
fundraising expenditures in the next two election cycles, leaving them to play catch-up 
for the next six years. 
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How Campaigns (Re)Allocate Resources 
 The notion that state parties reallocate resources from overhead spending to voter 
contact in presidential election years brings forth questions about the process by which 
parties and candidates allocate resources to various components of a campaign.  More to 
the point, with so many different ways to spend campaign money, it would be interesting 
to know which activities tend to be funded by reallocation of resources from other 
components of the campaign and which tend to be funded by the acquisition of additional 
resources (i.e. fundraising). 
 To get at this question, I adapt a technique employed by Ansolabehere and Gerber 
(1994) in their discussion of how to measure campaign spending.  In their article, 
Ansolabehere and Gerber calculate the elasticity between total campaign spending and 
“communications spending” (roughly equivalent to my voter contact category).  To do 
this, they regress total spending on communications spending29, with the estimated slope 
coefficient serving as their elasticity measure.  The interpretation of the elasticity is 
straightforward:  it is the effect on total campaign spending of additional spending on 
campaign communications.  For example, do campaigns that spend more on 
communications (for example) tend to have correspondingly higher total spending?  If so, 
and if (across cases) total spending tends to increase by the same amount that 
communications spending increases, we can infer that campaigns are raising additional 
money when they want to spend more on communications.  The elasticity in this case 
would be equal to one.  If, however, in looking at communications spending across cases, 
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we do not see proportional increases in total spending, then we can infer that campaigns 
are not able to raise additional money (which would be reflected in higher total spending) 
to pay for the increased communications spending.  As a result, the elasticity would be 
less than one. 
 By calculating elasticities, I am attempting to describe a general tendency among 
party and candidate campaigns.  For the purposes of this analysis, the elasticity between a 
component of a campaign and total campaign spending indicates what percentage of 
spending on the component is paid for by additional funds raised by the campaign.  
Conversely, the difference between 100 and the elasticity indicates what percentage of 
spending on the component is paid from “reallocated” money, or money that would have 
been spent on some other component. 
 In their analysis of incumbents and challengers running for the House in 1990, 
Ansolabehere and Gerber find that challenger communications spending has an elasticity 
value of 0.79 while incumbent communications spending has a value of 0.53.  This 
indicates that challengers pay for eighty percent of their communications expenditures 
with new money while incumbents pay for half of their communications spending with 
new money and half with reallocated resources. 
 I perform similar analyses for candidate and party campaign spending on 
overhead expenses, fundraising expenses, voter contact expenses, and (for candidates 
only) donations.  The data for candidates are presented in Table 3-7. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
29 Ansolabehere and Gerber use the natural logarithm of total and communications spending in their 
regression analyses, as will I. 
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 For overhead spending, all types of candidates in both chambers have elasticities 
of less than one.  Senate candidates tend to have higher overhead elasticities than do 
House candidates, and Senate open seat candidates have an overhead elasticity that is 
nearly equal to one, indicating that they are less willing to reallocate resources from other 
components of the campaign in order to spend more on overhead. 
 For spending on fundraising, one would expect the elasticity measures to be 
greater than one.  That is, if fundraising efforts generate more money than they cost, a 
dollar spent on fundraising should translate to total spending of greater than one dollar 
(the one dollar spent on fundraising plus the additional funds generated by the 
fundraising that were spent on other components of the campaign).  Yet we do not see 
fundraising elasticities for any type of candidate in either chamber that even approach 
one.  This result seems counterintuitive, that candidates have to pay for 40 to 50 percent 
of the cost of fundraising activities through reallocation of resources, rather than 
fundraising expenses paying for themselves (and more).  However, the explanation 
probably relates to the distinction between fixed and discretionary spending.  All 
candidates have fixed costs that they must spend money on (such as overhead and 
fundraising).  Only well financed candidates have the discretion to reallocate large 
amounts of money from one spending category to another.  Thus, what appears to be the 
reallocation of funds to fundraising is, in fact, a reflection of the fact that all campaigns 
have to spend money on fundraising thus “reallocate” funds that – if the candidate were 
flush and had another source of money to cover such fixed costs – would be spent on 






House  Slope Standard Error 
Overhead Incumbent .645 .014 
 Challenger .719 .011 
 Open Seat .838 .022 
Fundraising Incumbent .556 .015 
 Challenger .651 .012 
 Open Seat .573 .022 
Voter Contact Incumbent .448 .009 
 Challenger .932 .007 
 Open Seat .878 .010 
Donations Incumbent .050 .014 
 Challenger .453 .034 
 Open Seat .208 .029 
Senate  Slope Standard Error 
Overhead Incumbent .810 .044 
 Challenger .869 .028 
 Open Seat .997 .060 
Fundraising Incumbent .511 .040 
 Challenger .656 .035 
 Open Seat .656 .052 
Voter Contact Incumbent .699 .030 
 Challenger .913 .022 
 Open Seat .927 .024 
Donations Incumbent -.038 .051 
 Challenger .421 .063 
 Open Seat .374 .073 
 
Cell entries for ‘Slope’ are OLS regression coefficients for the regression: 
Log Total Spending = a + b (Log Component Spending) + error 
for each type of candidate 
 
 Spending on voter contact also exhibits elasticities of less than one for all types of 
candidates in both chambers, though incumbents have lower scores than do challengers 
and open seat candidates.  So while House incumbents, for example, pay for over half of 
their voter contact spending through the reallocation of existing resources, challengers 
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and open seat candidates pay for voter contact with around 90 percent new money.  
Given that challengers, in particular, have a serious fundraising disadvantage, these high 
elasticities make it all the more difficult for challengers to fund voter contact programs 
comparable to those of the incumbent, who can pay for large portions of voter contact 
with existing resources. 
 Finally, spending on donations to other candidates and party organizations reflect 
some of the lowest elasticities of any spending type, and the elasticities are particularly 
low for incumbents.  House incumbents pay for 95 percent of their donations with 
reallocated resources.  Senate incumbents even show a negative elasticity for donations, 
suggesting that Senate incumbents who want to donate money to colleagues and party 
organizations will not only pay for it entirely with reallocated resources, but also that 
Senate incumbents who give donations tend to reduce total spending at the same time. 
 Elasticity data for party expenditures are presented in Table 3-8.  In the case of 
overhead spending, the elasticity for Republican state parties approaches one and for 
Democratic state parties the value exceeds one.  This means that for Republican parties, 
additional overhead spending is reflected almost entirely in additional total spending, or 
that the overhead spending is paid for with additional resources.  For Democratic parties, 
the elasticity greater than one indicates inefficient expenditures.  Theoretically speaking, 
elasticities of greater than one are good for fundraising expenditures, but for other 
components of the campaign, elasticities greater than one indicate the money is being lost 
somewhere, in this case that total spending has increased by $1.08 but that the party only 





  Slope Standard Error 
Overhead Dem. 1.079 .030 
 Rep. .982 .026 
Fundraising Dem. .516 .030 
 Rep. .441 .033 
Voter Contact Dem. .616 .017 
 Rep. .481 .021 
 
Cell entries for ‘Slope’ are OLS regression coefficients for the regression: 
Log Total Spending = a + b (Log Component Spending) + error 
for each party 
 
 In terms of fundraising, parties pay additional fundraising expenses with 45 
percent to 50 percent new funds, the rest being reallocated from other components.  For 
voter contact, additional spending is paid for to a larger degree by additional funding, but 
even here up to 50 percent of the cost comes from other components of the campaign.  
This finding provides additional support for the idea presented above that, in presidential 
election years, parties increase voter contact spending through decreasing spending on 
overhead (see discussion of Table 3-6 above). 
 
Explaining Resource Allocation Decisions 
 To this point, I have described the general state of resource allocation in candidate 
and party campaigns as well as the trends in those allocations over the course the 1990s 
and early 2000s.  With respect to the former, I have shown that campaigns perform 
numerous activities, though candidates tend to allocate half or more of their resources to 
voter contact and try to limit overhead spending to one quarter of the budget; parties 
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spend more on overhead (which is understandable given their permanence), but they still 
manage to spend around a third of their resources on voter contact.  Concerning trends 
over time, it is important to note the rise of party spending that occurred over the 1990s.  
In terms of total spending, parties in 2000 and 2002 spent more than double what they did 
in 1992.  And while a pattern of emphasis on voter contact spending in presidential 
election years and on overhead spending in midterm years exists for parties, the data 
suggest a trend in which parties are moving away from overhead spending while 
increasing spending on voter contact.  Clearly parties are no longer relegated to service 
provision and Election Day mobilization; they have capitalized on opportunities to 
reassert themselves as independent campaigners who make significant expenditures in 
pursuit of their goals. 
 Having discussed how resource allocation to various components of the campaign 
is made possible by both additional fundraising and reallocation of resources among 
campaign components, it would be helpful at this point to attempt to get at why 
candidates and parties allocate resources in a particular fashion.  If they could, most 
candidates and parties would spend 100 percent on voter contact, but of course it is 
impossible to wage a campaign without spending money to raise money, without 
spending money on the people and things necessary to wage a campaign, and in the case 
of many incumbents, it is even preferable to give money to the party, constituent groups, 
and colleagues in pursuit of goals other than getting elected.  To that end, I will estimate 
several models designed to explain why candidates and parties allocate particular levels 
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of resources to overhead, fundraising, two types of voter contact (advertising and 
grassroots campaigning), and donations. 
 In the five models related to candidate campaigns, I employ five explanatory 
variables.  District Land Area is the size of the district in square miles30.  I expect that it 
will be positively associated with overhead (larger districts require larger organizations 
and therefore more overhead spending) and advertising (larger districts require forms of 
voter contact that are less labor intensive), negatively associated with grassroots 
campaigning (it would be harder to do extensive grassroots campaigning in larger 
districts), and I have no expectation in relation to fundraising and donations.  
Competition is based on Roll Call’s spring assessment of the competitiveness of each 
race (see Appendix A for more detail).  I expect competition to be positively related to all 
of the dependent variables except donations, where increased competitiveness will lead to 
less spending on donations.  Incumbent, Open Seat, and Democratic are dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the case fits those particular characteristics.  I expect 
more overhead, fundraising, advertising, grassroots, and donations from incumbents; 
more advertising, more grassroots campaigning, and fewer donations from open seat 
candidates; more overhead and more grassroots campaigning among Democrats.  Since it 
is possible that the effect of these variables on spending will be different for House and 
                                                        
30 Generally, larger districts require more campaign organization and an emphasis on “broadcast” rather 
than “retail” voter contact activities.  However, there are a few examples (Alaska, for one), where the 
district is large geographically but where the population is concentrated in a few areas; in these cases, 
campaigning may require less overhead and may be able to focus more on grassroots activities.  
Nonetheless, short of an accurate measure of population concentration, I believe district land area serves as 
a reasonable proxy. 
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Regression Results – Senate Candidates 
 






































































































R2 .310 .368 .358 .165 .568 
N 331 324 331 330 291 
 
** – statistically significant at the .01 level 
* – statistically significant at the .05 level 
+ – statistically significant at the .10 level 
Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression estimates 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 Tables 3-9 and 3-10 present the results of the five regression analyses.  For 
overhead spending, the Senate model explains thirty-one percent of the variance while 
the House model explains almost thirty-eight.  Coefficients for the same three variables 
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are statistically significant in both models.  It was expected that incumbents and those in 
competitive races would allocate more to overhead.  More unexpected is the finding that 
running for an open seat causes candidates to allocate greater resources to overhead, 
especially considering that this model controlled for the competitiveness of the race.  
Unexpectedly, coefficients for the Democratic dummy variable and for district land area 
were statistically insignificant.  Taken together, these two non-results suggest that a 
certain level of overhead spending is sufficient to maintain a campaign organization 
regardless of the size of the district, and that Democrats and Republicans alike have 
similar assessments of the amount of overhead required in a campaign. 
 For fundraising expenses, the Senate model explains slightly more than a third of 
the variance while the House model explains nearly half.  As before, both House and 
Senate models have the same, and same number of, coefficients that are statistically 
significant.  As expected, incumbents and candidates in competitive races spend more on 
fundraising – incumbents because they can while those in competitive races because they 
have to.  While I had no a priori expectations with regard to the Democratic and open 
seat dummy variables, both exhibit statistically significant coefficients.  Open seat 
candidates tend to allocate more to fundraising while Democrats tend to allocate less.  As 




Regression Results – House Candidates 
 






































































































R2 .379 .466 .292 .275 .687 
N 2912 2763 2814 2939 2402 
 
** – statistically significant at the .01 level 
* – statistically significant at the .05 level 
+ – statistically significant at the .10 level 
Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression estimates 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 For advertising expenses, the Senate model explains over thirty-five percent of the 
variance while the House model explains around thirty percent.  In this case, the Senate 
model had only three statistically significant coefficients while the House model had 
four.  The three relevant coefficients in the Senate model – competition, incumbent, and 
open seat – all exhibit positive coefficients.  It was expected that incumbents, open seat 
candidates, and candidates in more competitive races would have greater advertising 
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expenditures; this finding is mirrored in the House analysis.  Also for both types of 
candidates, the coefficient for Democratic candidates is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting there is no partisan difference in campaign strategy as it relates to the use of 
advertising.  The one difference in the two models is the coefficient for district land area 
variable, which is positive and statistically significant in the House model but 
insignificant in the Senate model.  A possible explanation for this result is that Senate 
candidates tend to rely on advertising while House candidates (most of whom have 
relatively small districts) tend to focus more on grassroots campaigning; when a House 
candidate does run in a large district (an entire state, for example), the size of the district 
strongly pushes him or her to spend money on advertising. 
 The models for grassroots campaigning explain only sixteen percent of the 
variance in the Senate model and almost twenty-eight percent of the variance in the 
House model.  Each has four variables with statistically significant coefficients, but not 
the same four.  In the Senate model, incumbents, open seat candidates, and candidates in 
competitive races allocate more to grassroots campaigning, as expected.  Interestingly, 
the coefficient for the Democratic candidate variable is negative and statistically 
significant, contrary to expectations.  The last variable in the Senate model, district land 
area, shows an insignificant coefficient.  In the House model, coefficients for 
competition, open seat candidates, and incumbents are statistically significant and in the 
expected direction, indicating that these factors are associated with increased grassroots 
spending.  More importantly, the coefficient for district land area is negative and 
statistically significant, as expected.  This result, coupled with the positive coefficient for 
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district land area in the model of advertising spending, confirms the assertion that House 
candidates in larger districts must move away from grassroots voter contact and focus on 
reaching voters through advertising.  Finally, the coefficient for the Democratic dummy 
variable fails to reach statistical significance; this finding is surprising, as one would have 
thought that Democratic candidates, with their tradition of strong grassroots mobilization, 
would be more inclined to spend money on this component of the campaign. 
 The models for donations explain much more of the variance than any of the 
previous four models.  The House model explains nearly sixty percent of variance while 
the Senate model explains nearly seventy percent.  As expected, incumbents and open 
seat candidates from both houses are more likely to allocate campaign resources to 
donations.  This was expected for incumbents, who are more likely to be in 
uncompetitive races and therefore willing to use campaign spending to pursue the 
secondary goal of building support in the community or among colleagues and party 
leaders.  The fact that open seat candidates also allocate more to donations perhaps 
speaks to the fact that once one controls for competitiveness, it does not seem 
unreasonable that open seat candidates are more likely than challengers to divert 
resources to a component of the campaign designed to pursue a secondary goal.  The key 
variable in these models, competition, is negative and statistically significant only in the 
model for House candidates, indicating that candidates in competitive races allocate less 
to donations as they focus on the goal of getting elected.  In the Senate model, on the 
other hand, the fact that the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance is probably a 
function of the fact that Senate races tend to be both more competitive and better funded 
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and thus Senate candidates are making donations without regard to the competitiveness of 
their races.  The coefficient for district land area also exhibits statistical significance in 
only the House model, though this is perhaps not as unexpected as one might think.  I 
have already shown that larger districts force House candidates to rely on (more 
expensive) advertising for voter contact, thus draining marginal funds that might have 
gone to donations if the candidate could have waged a campaign more focused on 
grassroots campaigning.  In the Senate model, the lack of statistical significance for the 
district land area coefficient makes sense, as Senate candidates in states of any size tend 
to rely on advertising for voter contact, again draining away those marginal funds that 
could have gone toward donations.  Finally, the coefficients for the Democratic dummy 
variable fail to reach statistical significance in either model, indicating no partisan 
difference in the use of campaign funds for donations. 
 Turning to party campaigns, I estimate four models using four explanatory 
variables.  Voting Age Population is the human size of the district, whereas District 
land area is the district’s geographic size.  I expect that districts with more people will 
have campaigns with greater overhead spending, greater fundraising expenditures, and 
more of both types of voter contact.  As before, I expect that districts with larger land 
areas will require more overhead spending as well as a reliance on advertising and a 
move away from grassroots campaigning.  Competition is calculated from the difference 
in the two-party vote for all house races in a state (see Appendix A for more detail).  I 
expect competition to be positively related to all four dependent variables.  Democratic 
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is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the party is a Democratic one.  I expect 
less overhead and more grassroots campaigning from Democratic state parties. 
 
Table 3-11 
Regression Results – Parties 
 











































































R2 .037 .013 .035 .035 
N 515 509 472 514 
 
** – statistically significant at the .01 level 
* – statistically significant at the .05 level 
+ – statistically significant at the .10 level 
Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression estimates 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 Table 3-11 presents the results of the four regression analyses.  None of the 
models explains much of the variance in the dependent variables; the explanatory 
variables do best explaining overhead spending, and even there they only account for 
around four percent of the variance. 
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 For overhead spending, only one variable has a statistically significant coefficient 
and it’s sign is in the wrong direction.  It would seem logical to expect more overhead 
spending from state parties that have to cater to larger populations.  Yet a reasonable 
explanation exists for this finding.  Note that the dependent variable in this case is not 
spending, but spending per 1000 voters.  With respect to the negative coefficient for 
voting age population, the differences in overhead spending that one would expect to see 
between states with small and large populations have already been built into the 
dependent variable.  As a result, the negative coefficient is likely the product of 
economies of scale, as more populous states are able to spend less per voter on overhead 
expenses even as they spend more in absolute terms than states with fewer people. 
 In the model for fundraising expenses, none of the variables have statistically 
significant coefficients.  It is not unexpected that the variables for district land area and 
for Democratic parties are statistically insignificant.  Even though Democratic state 
parties have been spending more than Republican ones over the last decade, there is no 
reason to believe that the cost of raising those funds is higher for one or the other.  It is 
also not surprising that district land area has an insignificant coefficient, as technology 
(direct mail and telephone solicitation) make it easy for parties to raise money regardless 
of the size of the state.  What is unexpected is the insignificant coefficient for voting age 
population.  One would expect parties in more populous states to have to spend more on 
fundraising because of larger numbers of potential donors.  Obviously controlling for 
voters in the dependent variable has eliminated the impact this variable can have on 
fundraising expenses. 
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 In the models for advertising expenses and grassroots campaigning, the 
coefficients for Democratic are positive and statistically significant.  While this was 
expected for grassroots campaigning, it was unexpected for advertising.  Given the 
fundraising advantage enjoyed by Republicans throughout much the 1990s, one would 
expect their state parties would be able to outspend the Democrats.  Also, in the model 
for grassroots campaigning, the coefficient for district land area is statistically significant 
and positive.  This result is unexpected, though it does seem reasonable to see that parties 
in larger states tend to spend more per voter for grassroots campaigning than those in 
smaller ones, reflecting the increased cost to parties of engaging in grassroots activities 
over a larger area. 
 A final note in regard to the models of party resource allocation concerns the 
relative unimportance of competition as an explanatory variable in these models.  Only in 
the model for advertising spending is the coefficient for the competition variable 
significant.  In that case, competition performs as expected, with parties in more 
competitive states spending more on advertising.  In the models for overhead spending, 
fundraising expenses, and grassroots campaigning, the coefficients for competition are 
statistically insignificant.  These results give the impression that state parties are not 
considering the strategic context when making spending decisions about these 
components of the campaign.  A more reasonable interpretation, however, is that parties 
spend money on overhead and fundraising regardless of the nature of competition within 
the state.  Since parties are enduring organizations, they have incentives to invest in 
overhead and raise money for future campaigns, even if those expenditures do nothing to 
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alter the strategic context of the current year’s election.  As for the insignificant 
coefficient for grassroots campaigning, the most plausible explanation is that in 
competitive areas, state parties focus their resources on broader appeals while leaving 
grassroots campaign activities to local party organizations. 
 
Conclusion 
 The preceding analyses shed light on the nature of political campaigns as they 
existed over the past twelve years.  Data on campaign spending by candidates and parties 
have helped answer three important questions:  what do campaigns spend money on, how 
has that spending changed over time, and what factors affect the way candidates and 
parties allocate resources. 
 For candidates, campaign spending is focused on voter contact.  Overall, 
candidate campaigns spend 50 to 60 percent of their budgets on voter contact, with 
Senate campaigns spending a larger portion of that on advertising while House 
campaigns spend more on grassroots campaigning.  Candidate campaigns tend to spend 
20 to 25 percent of their budgets on overhead and anywhere from 8 to 20 percent of their 
budgets on fundraising (the higher percentages coming from incumbents and Senate 
campaigns).  Parties, on the other hand, spend much more on overhead – generally 55 to 
60 percent of their budgets.  Another third goes to voter contact. 
 But these amounts are not fixed; in fact, they have shifted considerably since 
1992.  For candidates, allocations to overhead have decreased, especially among 
challengers and open seat candidates.  Open seat candidates increased their spending on 
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voter contact over the timeframe while incumbents shifted money toward donations and 
fundraising expenses.  Parties developed a pattern of increasing overhead spending in 
midterm election years while focusing on voter contact during presidential elections 
years.  Throughout the period, Republican parties outspent Democratic ones on overhead, 
and the opposite was true for voter contact. 
 Many factors play a role in determining where candidates and parties allocate 
resources, but clearly the most important factor for candidates is competition.  The 
competitiveness of the campaign influences campaign spending on overhead, fundraising, 
voter contact, and donations (in the opposite direction).  For parties, though, competition 
seems to be an important factor only when making decisions about spending on 
advertising.  Otherwise, parties seem to be spending on overhead, fundraising, and 
grassroots campaigning without regard to considerations of competitiveness, if not in 
pursuit of near term success than in hopes of future victories. 
 Having described what campaigns are doing, in the next chapter I will move on to 
describe how candidate and party campaigns interact in the creation of the campaign 
“nucleus,” or systematic effort to capture elective office.  Both party and (especially) 
candidate have an interest in seeing the candidate win, and as such both create campaigns 
in pursuit of that goal.  Electoral outcomes are the product of their combined efforts, but 
those efforts are not undertaken without consideration of what the other one is doing.  As 
I will show in the next chapter, the rise of parties as independent campaigner has 
drastically changed the way candidates create their own campaigns. 
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Chapter 4 – Strategic Behavior 
 
 In the preceding chapter I described modern party and candidate campaign 
organizations and looked into several factors that explain why parties and candidates 
allocate resources to particular components of the campaign.  In this chapter I argue that 
parties and candidates are strategic actors who consider more than the competitive nature 
of the state or race when making resource allocation decisions.  In fact, parties and 
candidates look to each other, and to other candidates on the ballot, when deciding how 
to put together their campaign organizations.  Specifically, it would be helpful to get a 
handle on what factors outside of their immediate electoral contest to parties and 
candidates consider when creating their campaigns.  What role do presidential campaigns 
play?  In what ways do candidates react to what the party is doing?  And how do 
candidates take into account the activities of other campaigns in their areas when making 
resource allocation decisions?  It is to these questions that I now turn. 
 
Strategic Behavior by Candidates and Parties 
 Much research into Congressional elections rests on the assumption that 
candidates are strategic actors (Jacobson, 1985-1986).  As a result, we would expect to 
see strategic behavior throughout the course of a campaign, from the decision to enter the 
race to the choice of electioneering tactics to the particular method of allocating 
resources.  For example, in the case of candidate emergence, Jacobson and Kernell 
(1983) show that “quality” challengers enter races when electoral conditions are 
90 
favorable.  Hetherington et al. (2003) suggest that elections immediately following 
redistricting are likely to exhibit those favorable conditions.  Another example of 
strategic behavior comes when candidates choose to use negative television advertising, a 
decision that results from the interplay between opposing candidates (Damore, 2002). 
 Strategic behavior is particularly crucial when candidates make decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources within a campaign.  In the case of presidential 
elections, the campaign is waged in multiple districts (states); as a result, candidates must 
allocate resources to states with more electoral votes (Brams 1978; Brams and Davis 
1974; Owen 1975), states that are more competitive (Shaw, 1999c; Nagler and Leighley, 
1992), or states that may be pivotal to the overall election outcome (Nagler and Leighley, 
1992).  Shaw (2003, 1999c) shows that presidential candidates do create strategies for 
winning under the Electoral College system and that the allocation of resources is based 
on these strategies, as well as the resource allocation patterns of the opponent.  Bartels 
(1985) presents a more nuanced view; after differentiating between instrumental 
resources (those vital to winning votes) and ornamental resources (those less important to 
winning votes), he shows that the former are distributed to the more populous states 
while the latter are distributed more broadly.  In the sequential primary system of the 
presidential nomination process, Gurian et al. (1998) show that candidates who are not 
the frontrunner allocate campaign resources to those states where they stand the best 
chance of beating the frontrunner. 
 Congressional candidates do not have to face the multiple district condition when 
making resource allocation decisions, though candidates in larger districts may have to 
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target resources to particular areas within the district.  More important, however, are the 
decisions regarding how much money to spend and on what to spend it.  Congressional 
candidates have been shown to consider their opponents when deciding how to spend 
money (Green and Krasno, 1988), with incumbents likely to engage in “defensive 
spending,” or spending large sums in response to a strong challenge (Jacobson, 1978).  
On the question of what to spend the money on, it is clear that candidates would prefer to 
spend more on activities designed to mobilize and persuade voters while allocating less 
toward campaign overhead and other features that do not directly bear on winning the 
election.  Studies of House (Herrnson, 1998a; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984) and 
Senate (VanHeerde, 2001) campaigns find that candidates spend anywhere from half to 
three-quarters of their budgets on voter contact activities.  
 Candidates are not the only political actors with incentives to behave strategically.  
Given their desire to help their candidates win elections, political parties also have the 
motivation to allocate resources strategically.  National parties, for example, allocate 
resources to congressional candidates based on electoral considerations (Nokken, 2003; 
Damore and Hansford, 1999; Herrnson, 1989).  State parties behave in a similar strategic 
fashion when they allocate resources to federal (Brox, 2004) and state legislative 
candidates (Schecter and Hedge, 2001).  As for funding their own campaigns, parties tend 
to raise and spend more money when competition is greater.  This phenomenon is called 
performance symmetry, or when party organizations exhibit similar levels of 
development as a result of a given level of competition as well as a similar electoral 
context (Marvick, 1980).  Stronger interparty competition will beget stronger party 
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organizations (Key, 1964).  For example, state party organizations will be stronger in 
states where both parties are competitive (Elkins, 1974).  At the local level, Gibson et al. 
(1985) find a strong correlation between strength of local Republican and Democratic 
party organizations, no doubt due to both reacting to the same electoral context.  
 
Studying Strategic Behavior 
 Previous research has established that candidates and parties make campaign 
decisions after considering the electoral context (especially the general level of 
competition) and the behavior of their opponents.  Yet the electoral context, in particular, 
can be quite complex, and scholars have employed numerous techniques in an attempt to 
capture that complexity.  In his models that analyze the impact of candidate spending on 
vote share, Jacobson (1978) uses previous vote in the district and the candidate’s party to 
account for local (long term) and national (short term) conditions, respectively.  Jacobson 
notes that the “party variable accounts for national short-term forces favoring one party 
or another in a particular election year” while previous vote serves “as an approximation 
of the expected or ‘normal’ vote,” (p. 471). 
 The idea that short term (partisan) forces – as opposed to long term conditions 
that would be manifested in a normal vote – bear on the way candidates run their 
campaigns lies at the heart of research into candidate coattails.  The common argument 
for coattails is that the forces that motivate presidential voting also have an influence on 
Congressional elections (Mondak, 1989; Campbell, 1986; Born, 1984; Calvert and 
Ferejohn, 1983).  One explanation for coattails is the “surge and decline” theory, or the 
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idea that the presidential campaign mobilizes people who would not have otherwise 
turned out, and that those individuals vote disproportionately for the winning presidential 
candidate and down-ballot candidates of the same party (Campbell 1991; Campbell, 
1966).  Beyond presidential elections, Chubb (1988) finds coattails effects of U.S. Senate 
and gubernatorial races on down-ballot elections. 
 The research into coattails is particularly appropriate because it rests on the 
assumption that the efforts of one race will affect the outcomes of other races.  
Candidates know this, so they adapt their strategies accordingly.  But other candidate 
campaigns are not the only other actors that will influence the electoral context in a 
district.  Candidates must also consider the activities of parties and interest groups who 
might also be working to influence the election outcome (Faucheux and Herrnson, 1999).  
As a result, it seems appropriate to revisit the question of why candidates and parties 
allocate resources in the ways that they do. 
 
Campaign Spending in Response to Opponents 
 The most obvious factor that candidates and parties consider when deciding how 
to spend campaign funds is the electoral context.  As two (or more) candidates face off in 
a contest for a single elective office, both must consider the same electoral conditions as 
well as each other’s likely behavior when making campaign decisions.  Because of this, 
one would expect candidates to spend money in a strategic fashion across five broad 
areas of the campaign:  overhead, fundraising activities, (electronic) advertising, 
grassroots campaign activities, and donations to other candidates and groups.  With 
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regard to the first four areas, one would expect candidates to spend money in a similar 
fashion:  if the Republican sees a need to invest more in overhead, the Democrat likely 
will as well.  But in the area of donations, one would expect candidates to have opposing 
strategies.  In competitive races, neither will spend much to donations; in uncompetitive 
races the frontrunner may choose to make donations while the underdog will forego 
making donations, due either to lack of funds or to an attempt to focus limited funds on 
voter contact activities. 
 To get a general picture of the campaign spending strategies of opposing 
candidates, I use data on campaign spending for U.S. House and Senate candidates from 
1992-2002 to assess the relationship between campaign spending in the five broad 
areas31.  Specifically, I have generated bivariate correlations between the five areas of 
spending for Republican and Democratic candidates in contested races.  The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 4-1. 
 Among Senate candidates, the hypothesized relationships do not exist except in 
the case of donations.  In that area, it appears that when one candidate chooses to spend 
funds on donations to other candidates and groups, his or her opponent spends less 
money to all aspects of his or her campaign.  This result is likely a product of 
competition; as illustrated in the previous chapter, competition is a driving force in the 
allocation of funds to donations.  Thus, it seems likely that it when a seat is safe enough 
that a Senate candidate can spend money to donations, the opponent is probably not 
going to have enough funding to spend much on any component of the campaign.  
                                                        
31 See Chapter 3 for a full description of the campaign spending data. 
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Among the other four areas of the campaign, the lack of relationship seems puzzling and 
may be a result of different candidate appraisals of the context in which the election is 
taking place. 
 Among candidates for the U.S. House, the hypothesized negative relationship for 
donations also appears, but so too do relationships for overhead, fundraising, and 
advertising.  As expected, opposing candidates do their best to match each other in 
spending on advertising:  as the Democrat spends more on advertising, so does the 
Republican.  For overhead and fundraising, however, the relationships are negative.  This 
too is likely the product of competition.  In uncompetitive races, as the frontrunner 
spends more on overhead and fundraising, the underdog must attempt to remain 
competitive by spending less on those areas (presumably to fund additional advertising).  
As was the case with Senate candidates, it appears that a clearer picture of this 
relationship would emerge if viewed through the lens of competition. 
 Table 4-1 also presents the bivariate correlation between four campaign 
components implemented by state political parties32.  As noted above, the concept of 
performance symmetry suggests that we would see similar patterns of campaign spending 
for Republican and Democratic state parties facing the same electoral context.  As the 
analysis of correlations confirms, this is indeed the case.  Along the main diagonal, three 
of the four relationships have coefficients that are positive and statistically significant.  
Thus, as both parties sense a more competitive statewide environment, both spend more 
on overhead, advertising, and grassroots.  It is also interesting to note a couple of 
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Table 4-1 
Correlation in Campaign Spending 
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Cell entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.  Significance levels in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
32 See Chapter 3 for an explanation of why I have omitted donations from the analysis of party resource 
allocation. 
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relationships that are not on the main diagonal.  As one party spends more on advertising, 
the other tends not only to spend more on its own advertising, it also tends to spend more 
on grassroots campaigning.  The inverse is also true – more grassroots by one begets 
more advertising by the other.  This performance symmetry between both types of voter 
contact activities confirms earlier research and speaks to the way that state parties react to 
a highly competitive environment. 
 Given the importance of competition in the creation of candidate campaign 
spending strategies, I have reanalyzed the bivariate correlations between candidates, 
separated by level of competition.  The results of this analysis for Senate candidates are 
presented in Table 4-2. 
 Among candidates for safe seats, there is generally little relationship between the 
spending strategies of the opposing candidates.  There are only two exceptions to this 
general rule.  The first – as expected – is the negative and statistically significant 
coefficients for the relationship between one candidate’s donations and all five campaign 
components of the opponent’s campaign.  As discussed above, this is clearly the product 
of situation where frontrunners spend more on donations as the underdog spends less (if 
anything at all) on them.  The second exception is the negative relationship between 
opposing candidate fundraising spending.  Given that all the cases here are safe seats, the 
explanation for this finding lies in the fact that fundraising – like donations – does not 
win votes, so sure losers spend little on fundraising while sure winners will likely spend 
more money to raise money in order to afford donations or to generate a warchest for 
future campaigns.  Besides those negative relationships, Senate candidates contesting safe  
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Table 4-2 
Correlation in Campaign Spending in the Senate – By Level of Competition 
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Table 4-2 (continued) 
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Cell entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.  Significance levels in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
seats do not appear to be reacting strategically to each other’s spending decisions.  In 
other words, the frontrunners likely spend whatever they want on each area of the 
campaign while the underdogs spend little. 
 Among Senate candidates contesting seats in which one candidate is favored, the 
only relationship that appears is the negative one for donations and a few (but not all) 
components of the opponents campaign.  Otherwise, there again appears to be no 
relationship between what one candidate spends on a particular campaign component and 
what his or her opponent does. 
 The story changes, however, for Senate candidates engaged in races that are only 
leaning toward one of the candidates or are truly competitive.  Here the negative 
relationship between one candidate’s donations and all other campaign components of the 
opposing candidate falls away, presumably because the competitive nature of the race 
makes it irrational for either candidate to devote precious resources to donations.  The 
other components, on the other hand, exhibit coefficients that are positive and statistically 
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significant, indicating that as the Republican spends more on overhead, advertising, and 
grassroots activities, so does the Democrat.  Part of this relationship is certainly a factor 
of increased spending by both candidates in the more competitive races.  But these 
positive relationships also suggest that candidates are responding strategically by 
spending money on the same types of activities.  It is also interesting to note that in the 
case of candidates for leaning seats – but not for competitive seats – there emerges a 
pattern similar to that for state parties, where spending by one candidate on advertising is 
related to increased spending by the other on both advertising and grassroots activities 
(and vice versa). 
 Among candidates for U.S. House, the story is largely the same.  Table 4-3 
presents the results of an analysis of the correlation in campaign spending for House 
candidates, segmented by level of competition.  For candidates in safe and favored races, 
there is very little relationship between the spending patterns, save the aforementioned 
pattern related to spending on donations.  For candidates in leaning and competitive 
races, there is support – though more limited – for strategic behavior.  For candidates in 
leaning races, the only coefficient that is positive and statistically significant is the one 
for advertising, while in competitive races that coefficient is more strongly positive and 
the one for overhead spending is positive and statistically significant.  As with their 
Senate counterparts, these House candidates in the top two levels of competition appear 
to be reacting strategically to the competitive electoral context, though it remains unclear 
why the relationships between campaign spending by Senate candidates are stronger than 
those for House candidates.  An explanation for this discrepancy perhaps lies in the fact 
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that Senate contests are of a higher profile, with more professional campaigns and higher 
levels of spending, thus placing a premium on strategic behavior on the part of those who 
allocate campaign resources. 
 
Table 4-3 
Correlation in Campaign Spending in the House – By Level of Competition 
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Table 4-3 (continued) 
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Cell entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.  Significance levels in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
 
Campaign Spending in Response to Other Campaigns 
 As candidates and parties consider the context of a particular election, they cannot 
focus solely on the characteristics of the district and the behavior of their opponents.  The 
actions of other campaigns will certainly bear on the results in a particular district, and 
strategic politicians will certainly consider these “outside” influences when making 
decisions regarding campaign spending. 
 Perhaps the most prominent outside influence on a given election is the activity 
associated with the presidential campaigns.  Presidential campaigns tend to target only a 
subset of states based on their own Electoral College strategies (Shaw, 1999c), but in 
those states the presidential campaigns invest significant resources to create campaign 
organizations and to reach voters.  Down ballot candidates certainly have to adjust their 
own behavior if they are running in state or district that will see extensive presidential 
campaigning. 
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 To assess the likely influence of the presidential campaigns on state parties and 
down ballot candidates, I perform two analyses.  The first assesses the relationship 
between campaign spending and the intensity of presidential campaigning.  Specifically, I 
have generated bivariate correlations between the five areas of spending for candidates 
and parties and an ordinal level measure of a state’s battleground status.  The use of the 
battleground status measure serves as a proxy for a host of presidential campaign 
attributes.  Battleground states have extensive presidential campaign organizations, they 
see greater volumes of advertising and grassroots voter contact from the presidential 
campaigns, and experience more candidate appearances.  Parties and down ballot 
candidates would have to adjust to all of these factors, as well as the attending changes in 
voter attitudes that accompany such increased campaigning.  The results of this analysis 
are presented in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4 
Correlation Between Campaign Spending and Presidential Battleground Status 
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 For Senate candidates, it appears that the presence (or absence) of the presidential 
campaign in a state is not related to spending on various components of their own 
campaigns.  Given that Senate races tend to be more competitive (or at least more 
competitive than the vast majority of House races) and of a higher profile, it appears that 
Senate candidates create campaign organizations, raise funds, contact voters, and donate 
to other candidates and groups without regard for the efforts of the colleagues on the top 
of the ballot. 
 The story is quite different for House candidates, however.  House candidates 
running in battleground states tend to spend less on overhead, less on fundraising, and 
less on grassroots campaign activities.  These three results, as well as the insignificant 
coefficient for advertising, all conform to what one would expect.  In a presidential 
battleground, voter interest will likely be high, as will the mobilization efforts of the 
presidential campaign, so House candidates will not need to spend as much on grassroots 
campaign activities.  As a result, they do not need to create as extensive a campaign 
organization, and thus they may not need to spend as much on their fundraising 
operations.  Advertising, on the other hand, is the prime method for engaging in voter 
persuasion, and the presence of the presidential campaign should not alter the House 
candidate’s desire to reach persuadable voters and bring them into his or her camp. 
 State parties in battleground states also have to adapt to the presence of a vigorous 
presidential campaign.  In the case of parties, those in battleground states tend to spend 
more on fundraising, advertising, and grassroots campaign activities.  Given that the 
purpose of the party is to assist its candidates, it makes sense that even state parties would 
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ramp up their efforts in those states the presidential candidates consider crucial.  Plus, a 
state being a presidential battleground probably indicates that the state as a whole is 
competitive, and so other candidates on the ballot would benefit from the increased state 
party advertising and grassroots campaigning.  Increased fundraising is a function of the 
fact that these parties need more money to sustain this higher level of activity.  What they 
do not need, apparently, is more overhead.  The insignificant coefficient suggests that 
state parties spend money on overhead regardless of the nature of the presidential 
campaign being waged in the state.  This makes sense, given that state parties are 
permanent organizations that require overhead to contest elections and support 
lawmakers, functions that do not depend on the intensity of the presidential campaign. 
 The second assessment of the impact of the presidential campaign on candidate 
and party campaign spending deals specifically with voter contact activities.  Besides 
appearances (which I argue is adequately covered in the battleground analysis above), the 
prime method of voter contact for presidential campaigns is television advertising.  Other 
candidates and parties will have to adjust their own levels of voter contact activities to 
account for the volume of presidential campaign advertising in the state.  One would 
expect that candidates – though not parties – would engage in more advertising as the 
presidential candidates spend more on advertising, not only to break through with their 
own messages, but also because the costs will be higher due to increased demand for air 
time.  For grassroots campaign activities, one would expect that candidates would spend 
less (due to the mobilizing effect of presidential advertising) while parties would spend 
more (for the same reason that the presidential candidates are spending more – running in 
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a competitive state).  To assess the impact of presidential advertising on candidate and 
party campaign spending, I analyze the bivariate correlations between the advertising and 
grassroots spending for candidates and parties and the number of gross ratings points of 
advertising their presidential candidate purchased in the state.  The results of this analysis 
are presented in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5 
Correlation Between Campaign Spending and Presidential Advertising 
 
 Advertising Grassroots 
Senate cand 


















Cell entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.  Significance levels in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
 
 As was the case with the battleground analysis, spending by Senate candidates on 
voter contact activities does not appear to be related to the amount of presidential 
advertising that is purchased in their state.  The lack of significance on the advertising 
coefficient is understandable; Senate elections may be significant enough that candidates 
do not have to purchase any more advertising than they would have to break through the 
presidential advertising.  As for the insignificant grassroots activity coefficient, this too is 
not completely surprising considering that Senate candidates tend to spend a much 
smaller percentages of their budgets on this component of the campaign than do House 
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candidates33, so additional presidential advertising may not have the effect of further 
reducing this amount.  Spending by House candidates and state parties, on the other hand, 
is related to the number of gross ratings points purchases by the presidential campaigns.  
As expected, House candidates spend less on grassroots when the presidential campaigns 
spend more on advertising; it seems they are indeed allowing others to do their 
mobilization for them.  What is unexpected, however, is the insignificant coefficient for 
advertising.  While it makes sense to think that House candidates would spend more to 
get their message out and persuade voters, it may be the case that this result is an indirect 
example of coattails; in areas of high presidential advertising, House candidates may 
advertise as the would normally, counting their presidential candidate’s commercials as 
just additional voter contact on their behalf.  An alternate explanation for the lack of 
relationship lies in the fact that most House campaigns are uncompetitive, and House 
candidates in uncompetitive races are not going to spend much on advertising regardless 
of the competitiveness of (and hence level of advertising in) the presidential campaign.  
For state parties, the expectations are confirmed, as increased presidential advertising is 
generally a signal of a competitive state, and state parties in turn increase their levels of 
advertising and grassroots campaigning. 
 But the presidential campaign is not the only one that candidates must take into 
account when planning their own campaigns.  The efforts of other candidates on the top 
of the ballot, as well as the state party’s campaign, will influence how down-ballot 
candidates conduct their campaigns.  To assess these influences, I perform two further 
                                                        
33 See Chapter 3 for further detail regarding Senate campaign resource allocation. 
108 
analyses of correlation in campaign spending.  The first assesses the relationship between 
candidate campaign spending and that of the state party.  In a truly candidate-centered 
environment, one would expect the efforts of the party to have no bearing the what the 
candidates do with their own campaigns.  However much research has shown that 
candidates consider the efforts of the party to be helpful (Hogan, 2000; Frendreis and 
Gitelson, 1996; Herrnson, 1986), and it is reasonable to expect that they will adapt their 
own campaigns when they see party campaigning on their behalf.  Specifically, while one 
would expect no relationship between candidate and party allocations to overhead and 
fundraising, one would expect candidates to allocate less to grassroots campaigning when 
the state parties allocates more, and more to advertising when parties allocate more (in 
response to a presumably competitive race). 
 Table 4-6 presents the results of this analysis.  For both Senate and House 
candidates, the expectation of no relationship between the candidate’s overhead or 
fundraising spending and that of the state party is confirmed.  Despite the resurgence of 
parties as independent campaigners, it is still a candidate-dominated era, and candidates 
have to create (and fund) their own organizations regardless of what the party is doing.  
As for the voter contact activities, the expectations are largely unsupported.  For 
grassroots campaigning, state party spending is unrelated to Senate candidate spending 
and positively related to House candidate spending.  Rather than rely on the state party to 
mobilize voters, it appears that House candidates and state parties are reacting to the 
competitive environment in a similar fashion, both spending money for the mobilization 
for voters.  Also unsupported (in the case of House candidates) is the expectation that 
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increased state party advertising will be associated with increased candidate advertising.  
Instead, as parties spend more on advertising, House candidates spend less.  The one 
confirmed expectation is that among Senate candidates, increased state party advertising 
is associated with increased candidate advertising. 
 
Table 4-6 
Correlation Between Candidate Campaign Spending 
and State Party Campaign Spending 
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Cell entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.  Significance levels in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
 
 The second analysis of correlation in campaign spending assesses the relationship 
between campaign spending by House and Senate candidates.  Given the results in Tables 
4-4 and 4-5 above, it is clear that spending by House candidates is related to that of 
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candidates at the top of the ballot.  As a result, it is not unreasonable to think that House 
candidates will also consider how the Senate candidate of the same party spends money 
on his or her campaign.  Yet there is no theoretical reason to expect a relationship 
between the House and Senate candidates’ spending on overhead, fundraising, 
advertising, or donations, as each candidate is involved in separate campaigns that tend 
not to get conflagrated in the minds of voters.  One would expect, however, less spending 
on grassroots campaigning by the House candidate when the Senate candidate spends 
more, on the assumption that the House candidate could save money on those activities 
when the Senate candidate is providing them. 
 
Table 4-7 
Correlation Between Senate and House Candidate Campaign Spending 
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Cell entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.  Significance levels in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
 
 Table 4-7 presents the results of this analysis.  All of the expectations are 
confirmed in that House candidate spending on overhead, fundraising, advertising, and 
donations is unrelated to Senate candidate allocations to the same components.  Also, as 
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Senate candidates allocate more to grassroots, House candidates tend to allocate less.  
This result, as well as similar results for the relationship between House candidate 
campaigns and presidential campaigns (see Tables 4-4 and 4-5) suggest that House 
candidates in particular are apt to cut costs on grassroots campaigning when they see 
other candidates engaging in such activity. 
 
Revised Models Explaining Campaign Spending Decisions 
 The results of the correlation analyses are suggestive that candidates and parties 
consider more than just their opponents and the characteristics of the state or district 
when making decisions about how to spend campaign funds.  The data presented in 
Tables 4-4 through 4-7 hint at strategic behavior on the part of candidates and parties 
who look to the presidential campaigns, to the state parties (on the part of the candidates), 
and to the Senate candidate (on the part of House candidates) as they go about creating 
their campaigns.  But correlation is not causation, and these analyses test only bivariate 
relationships.  To address adequately the question of whether Congressional candidates 
look to other campaigns in their districts when making their own campaign spending 
decisions, we must turn to a multivariate model. 
 To that end, I estimate several models designed to explain why candidates and 
parties spend particular amounts of money on the various components of their campaigns.  
These models are similar to those presented in Chapter 3, but they have been modified to 
reflect the results discussed above.  More to the point, the models of campaign spending 
will be fully specified to include as explanatory variables those from the Chapter 3 
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analyses that exhibited statistically significant coefficients as well as those from the 
above analyses that exhibited statistically significant correlation coefficients.  For Senate 
campaigns, the only relationship noted above was between advertising spending and state 
party advertising spending, so only the model of Senate campaign advertising will be 
included.  For House campaigns, several factors discussed above yielded significant 
correlations coefficients, so I will estimate models for spending on overhead, fundraising, 
advertising, and grassroots campaigning.  For state party campaigns, the presidential 
variables (battleground and gross ratings points) had significant correlations to three 
campaign components, so I will estimate models for spending on fundraising, advertising, 
and grassroots campaigning. 
 In the model of Senate campaign spending on advertising, I include three 
variables found to be important in Chapter 3.  Competition is based on Roll Call’s spring 
assessment of the competitiveness of each race34.  I expect increased competition to lead 
to increased advertising spending.  Incumbent and Open Seat are dummy variables 
indicating whether or not the case fits those particular characteristics.  As before, I expect 
both the have positive coefficients as incumbents and open seat candidates are likely to 
spend more on advertising than challengers.  Party Advertising is the amount of money 
spent per 1000 voters on electronic advertising by the Senate candidate’s state party, 
adjusted to 2002 dollars and then logged.  While the bivariate correlation between this 
variable and the dependent variable was positive, the fact that this model controls for the 
level of competition means that the independent effect of party advertising on Senate 
                                                        
34 See the Appendix A for more detail. 
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candidate advertising may fall away.  As a result, I have no a priori expectation for its 
coefficient. 
 The results of the Senate regression analysis are presented in Table 4-8.  All 
expectations (or lack of expectations) are confirmed.  Incumbents, open seat candidates, 
and those in competitive races allocate more money to advertising.  Furthermore, the 
insignificant coefficient for party advertising shows that Senate candidates are not 
looking to other campaigns when making allocation decisions for their own race. 
 
Table 4-8 
Regression Results – Senate Candidates 
 
 Natural Log of Advertising Spending 
























** – statistically significant at the .01 level 
* – statistically significant at the .05 level 
Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression estimates 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 In the four models of House campaign spending on advertising, I include several 
variables found to be important in Chapter 3.  Besides Competition, Incumbent and 
Open Seat, I include measures of District Land Area (the size of the district in square 
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miles35) as well as a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate is Democratic.  In 
all four models I expect more spending by candidates in competitive races, incumbents, 
and open seat candidates.  I expect more advertising in larger districts and less grassroots 
campaigning.  I also expect less fundraising and advertising by Democrats.  Based on the 
correlations analyzed above, I expect less spending on overhead, fundraising, and 
grassroots for candidates in Battleground states.  As with Senate candidates, I expect no 
relationship between Party Advertising and House candidate advertising now that the 
model controls for the level of competition.  Finally, the model for spending on 
grassroots campaigning has measures of presidential Gross Ratings Points, Party 
Grassroots Campaigning, and Senate Candidate Grassroots Campaigning.  I expect 
no relationship between GRPs and candidate advertising (due to the control for level of 
competition), though I suspect the two grassroots campaigning explanatory variables will 
have negative coefficients indicating the House candidate is piggybacking on there 
mobilization efforts. 
 The results of the House regression analysis are presented in Table 4-9.  In the 
model of overhead spending, the three variables identified in Chapter 3 again show 
statistically significant coefficients in the expected direction.  In addition, the coefficient 
for the battleground variable is negative and statistically significant.  This could signify 
 
                                                        
35 Generally, larger districts require more campaign organization and an emphasis on “broadcast” rather 
than “retail” voter contact activities.  However, there are a few examples (Alaska, for one), where the 
district is large geographically but where the population is concentrated in a few areas; in these cases, 
campaigning may require less overhead and may be able to focus more on grassroots activities.  
Nonetheless, short of an accurate measure of population concentration, I believe district land area serves as 
a reasonable proxy. 
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Table 4-9 




































































































R2 .394 .468 .288 .320 
N 1499 1408 2789 1127 
 
** – statistically significant at the .01 level 
* – statistically significant at the .05 level 
a – significance = .063 
 
that House candidates in battleground states do not feel the need to create as strong a 
campaign organization as they might otherwise, due to the presence of the presidential 
candidate’s organization.  In the model of fundraising spending, three of the variables 
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identified in Chapter 3 show statistically significant coefficients in the expected direction, 
but in this case the coefficient for the Democratic dummy variable fails to reach statistical 
significance.  In this model the coefficient for battleground states is negative and 
statistically significant.  Since the battleground variable is the only addition to the House 
fundraising model specified in Chapter 3, its presence must be what accounts for the 
Democratic dummy variable failing to produce a significant coefficient.  The coefficient 
for battleground is negative; as discussed above, I believe this result is a function of 
House candidates not spending as much on overhead, and as a result not having to spend 
as much raising funds.  In the model of advertising spending, the results for House 
candidates are similar to those for Senate candidates:  the variables identified in Chapter 
3 are statistically significant and in the expected direction while the new variables 
identified by means of correlations fail to reach statistical significance.  Finally, in the 
model of spending on grassroots campaigning, all of the Chapter 3 variables retain 
coefficients that are statistically significant coefficients and with the expected sign, and 
here three of the four “other campaign” variables have significant coefficients.  Thus, 
with respect to grassroots campaigning, House candidates feel comfortable spending less 
when their Senate candidates are spending more and/or when they can count on the 
efforts of the presidential campaign (though not necessarily its advertising).  On the other 
hand, House candidates spend more to grassroots when they see the state party doing the 
same. 
 Finally, I estimate models of state party spending on fundraising, advertising, and 
grassroots campaigning.  These models incorporate from Chapter 3 measures of 
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Competition, District Land Area, the Democratic dummy variable.  From the above 
analyses, they include variables for Battleground states and presidential Gross Ratings 
Points.  As the rationale behind my expectations can be seen earlier in this chapter and in 
Chapter 3, let it suffice to say that I expect positive coefficients for all explanatory 
variables in all three models. 
 The results of the state party regression analysis are presented in Table 4-10.  In 
the model of fundraising spending, no variables from the Chapter 3 model were 
statistically significant, so the only regressor is the Battleground variable.  As expected, 
its coefficient is significant and positive, indicating that state parties do indeed increase 
their fundraising efforts when faced with an intense presidential campaign.  In the model 
of advertising spending, competition strangely enough fails to reach statistical 
significance.  Given that the measure of competition for state parties measures overall 
statewide competition and not the level of competition for any particular race, this 
nonresult perhaps makes sense in light of the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for presidential gross ratings points.  In other words, state parties increase 
their advertising efforts in relation to the competitiveness of the race at the top of the 
ballot.  Of the other two terms in the advertising model, the coefficient for the 
Democratic dummy variable is significant and positive while the coefficient for the 
battleground measure fails to reach statistical significance (no doubt due to the presence 
of the gross ratings points measure).  
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Table 4-10 
Regression Results – State Parties 
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R2 .042 .143 .090 
N 170 150 170 
 
** – statistically significant at the .01 level 
* – statistically significant at the .05 level 
a – significance = .053 
 
In the model of spending on grassroots campaigning, the previously identified variables 
again work as expected, and unfortunately both new “outside campaign” variables fail to 
register.  Given that one of the main functions of a state party is to engage in grassroots 
mobilization, it is perhaps no surprise that it spends funds on this function without regard 




 The preceding analyses provide some interesting detail regarding how candidates 
and parties decide how much to spend on various components of their campaigns.  In 
addition to considering the opposition and the general electoral context, the results 
presented here suggest these strategic politicians also look to other campaigns in their 
state or district when spending money on overhead, fundraising, advertising, and 
grassroots campaigning. 
 While analysis of correlations provides some clues as to what factors might affect 
this behavior, the multivariate models provide a clearer picture of what factors affect the 
decision to spend more or less money on a particular component of a campaign.  The data 
presented in Tables 4-8, 4-9, and 4-10 yield three broad points.  First, spending by Senate 
candidates is best explained by the level of competition as well as the status of the 
candidate.  Other campaigns do not appear to affect spending in Senate campaigns, 
suggesting that Senate races are prominent enough for candidates to behave rather 
independently of other actors.  The second broad point is the candidate advertising is not 
affected by the behavior of outside actors.  While other components of the campaign 
might respond to these external influences, advertising is still the primary way House and 
Senate candidates communicate their messages to voters, and they appear not to alter 
their advertising strategies based on what others are doing.  A third and final broad point 
is that spending on other components of the campaign – overhead, fundraising, grassroots 
campaign – is indeed affected by the behavior of outside actors.  Strategic politicians – 
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both candidates and parties – look to what other politicians in their area are doing before 
they spend precious funds to these important components of the campaign. 
 With a better understanding of why candidates and parties spend money in the 
way that they do, it is now time to assess whether this spending has an impact on the 
behavior of voters, either as individuals or in the aggregate.  Considering the efforts of 
both candidate and party and focusing solely on their voter contact activities, I will show 
in the next chapter that campaigns do have demonstrable effects on voters. 
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Chapter 5 – Campaign Effects 
 
 In the preceding two chapters I described the nature of party and candidate 
campaigns and showed how each party leaders and candidates look not only to their 
opponents but also to other campaigns in their districts when allocating resources to key 
components of their organizations.  At this point we turn to an assessment of campaign 
effects.  It is important for scholars of campaign effects look to both the party and 
candidate in this assessment, as both will influence voters and hence the outcome on 
Election Day.  More specifically, do both candidate and party efforts have an impact on 
the decision to turnout?  Do they have the power to persuade voters toward (or against) a 
candidate?  And do these effects vary depending on the characteristics of the voters?  It is 
to these questions that I now turn. 
 
The Search for Campaign Effects 
 Over the last several years many scholars have sought to counter claims that 
campaigns have limited – or minimal – effects.  The minimal effects thesis, however, 
pertains primarily to presidential campaigns.  Certainly, one is more likely to see 
campaign effects in lower-profile elections where it is less likely that the campaigns 
balance one another out.  And much research has identified campaign effects in sub-
presidential elections.  Spending in Congressional elections has effects on both vote 
choice (Jacobson, 1990; Abramowitz, 1988) and turnout (Caldeira, Patterson, and 
Markko, 1985).  In gubernatorial elections, campaign spending has been shown to have 
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an effect on turnout (Patterson and Caldeira, 1983).  And in state legislative elections – 
where the candidates and campaigns are much less visible – there is a strong connection 
between campaign spending and electoral success, especially in larger states and states 
with professional legislatures (Cassie and Breaux, 1998). 
 But recent efforts have also turned up campaign effects in presidential campaigns.  
Studies using aggregate analysis have shown that campaigns can persuade voters and thus 
affect aggregate vote totals and public opinion.  Television advertising and candidate 
appearances have an impact on aggregate vote totals (Shaw, 1999b).  In addition, national 
conventions and debates (Holbrook, 1996) as well as other aspects of an election 
campaign such as campaign messages, events, and mistakes (Shaw, 1999c) have an effect 
on public opinion.  Furthermore, recent studies have shown that presidential campaigns 
have an impact through agenda-setting, priming, and framing effects (Mendelberg, 1997; 
Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody, 1996; Petrocik, 1996). 
 Despite these impressive findings, there is still a great deal of room for 
improvement in the description and prediction of campaign effects.  One area of 
oversight in this literature is the failure to adequately integrate the efforts of political 
parties into the study of campaign effects.  Campaigns are no longer merely the money 
and service providers as scholars of campaigns often portray them.  As it stands, the 
literature has a very bifurcated view as to where to search for campaign effects, with 
some studies focusing on the efforts of party organizations while others focus on the 
campaign efforts of candidates.  Campaign effects researchers need to conceptualize 
campaign effects as the product of the efforts of both types of campaigns. 
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 This study seeks to build on previous research into campaign effects and to 
address oversights in the literature.  Specifically, this study looks to address several 
issues related to the effects of campaign activity:  what components of the campaign have 
effects on voters?  are those effects manifested in individual level behavior or are they 
only apparent in the aggregate?  is it the party’s campaign organization or the candidate’s 
campaign – or both – that has an effect on voters?  do those effects vary depending on the 
characteristics of the voters?  By looking at party and candidate campaigns over five 
recent election cycles, we can hope to get a clearer picture of the nature of these effects. 
 To that end, I make use of the data from the Campaign Finance Analysis Project 
and Federal Election Commission that are described fully in Chapter 3.  These data cover 
Congressional races from 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002.  There are 170 Senate races 
in the dataset and 2175 House races. 
 In the subsequent analyses, I employ as explanatory variables the two categories 
that reflect voter contact activity:  advertising and grassroots campaigning.  In addition to 
these expenditure data, I make use of data on campaign competitiveness and yearly 
inflation.  The latter, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, were used to adjust the 
campaign spending data for earlier years to constant 2002 dollars.  Individual level 
analyses were performed on the National Election Studies Cumulative Data File (Sapiro 
et al., 2003) while aggregate analyses were performed on data collected from various 
sources that are described fully in Appendix A. 
With these data, I focus on how candidate and party campaigns seek to affect 
voter behavior.  But this is more than just a study of the effects of campaign spending.  
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Total campaign spending is a poor proxy for campaign activity as it includes spending on 
many features (overhead, fundraising expenses) that are not perceived by voters.  Only by 
focusing on those spending categories that relate to voter contact will we get an unbiased 
assessment of campaign effects.  Further, campaigns do not engage in activity with one 
“effect” in mind; some efforts are designed to persuade undecided (likely) voters while 
other efforts are designed to mobilize (likely) supporters who may not participate.  By 
looking at the how candidate and party advertising and grassroots campaigning might 
differentially persuade and mobilize, we will take a small step closer to understanding the 
true effects of campaign activity. 
 
Individual Level Campaign Effects 
 One would expect that campaign activity would benefit the candidate or party 
who performs it.  This expectation stems straightforwardly from an assumption that 
political elites (candidates, campaign workers, party officials) are rational actors who 
make decisions in order to achieve particular goals – in this case the winning of elections.  
At the individual level, this expectation leads one to believe that increased campaign 
spending by a candidate or party will make individuals more likely vote for that candidate 
or that party’s candidate(s).  It also suggests that increased campaign spending will make 
individuals more likely to turnout to vote. 
 Several studies have identified individual level campaign effects on vote choice.  
Presidential debates have been shown to affect vote choice (Holbrook, 1996; Geer, 1988), 
with the candidate who was perceived to have “won” the debate gaining support among 
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voters.  Hillygus and Jackman (2003) also find that nominating conventions move 
individuals to support presidential candidates.  Considering turnout, previous research has 
shown how campaigns can mobilize individuals to turnout to vote.  Experimental 
research, in particular, has found that grassroots contacting (Gerber and Green, 2000) and 
media advertising (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995) increase the likelihood of voting.  In 
addition, survey research has shown that individuals are more likely to turnout to vote 
when they are mobilized by political elites (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; 
Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). 
 In order to test the impact of voter contact spending on individual level voting 
behavior, I use data from the National Election Studies to estimate logistic regression 
models of vote choice and turnout.  For the former, I estimate separate models for House 
and Senate elections.  As explanatory variables I include measures of Republican and 
Democratic candidate advertising spending and grassroots contact spending36.  I 
also include measures of Republican and Democratic state party advertising spending 
and grassroots contact spending37. 
 Aside from these eight campaign variables, I include several control variables 
related to vote choice.  Party identification (Campbell et al, 1960), income (McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal, 2003), and race (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, 2002; Wayne, 
2000) all bear on one’s choice among candidates.  I also include a measure of the level of 
competition of each race to control for more spending occurring in more competitive 
races.  This control allows for a campaign effect to show in an otherwise uncompetitive 
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race.  Finally, given the pooled nature of the analysis, I have included dummy variables 
for the years. 
 I estimate the House model on respondents in 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2000.  I omit 
2002 from the House analysis because the CFAP did not make available the data on 
campaign spending for House candidates in 2002.  The Senate model includes 2002, but 
since the NES Cumulative Data File does not include the income measure for the 2002 
respondents, it is omitted from the Senate model. 
 The results of the individual level vote choice analysis are presented in Table 5-1.  
Since the dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual voted for the Republican and 0 if 
the individual voted for the Democrat, positive coefficients indicate an increased 
likelihood of voting Republican and negative coefficients a decreased likelihood. 
 In the analysis of voting for the U.S. House of Representatives, only three of the 
eight campaign variables have statistically significant coefficients.  And interestingly 
enough, all three coefficients have signs that are the opposite of what one would expect.  
For example, as the Democratic candidate spent more on advertising, the respondent was 
more likely to vote for the Republican for the House of Representatives.  Also, as a state 
Republican party spent more on advertising, the respondent was less likely to vote for the 
Republican.  Finally, as the Republican candidate spent more on grassroots contact, the 
individual was less likely to vote for him or her. 
 However, a reasonable explanation exists for these counterintuitive findings.  
Even controlling for level of competition, all three findings are likely the result of parties 
                                                                                                                                                                     
36 As is the custom in the literature, I have taken the natural logarithm of the candidate and party spending 
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and candidates spending larger sums of money competitive races.  As a result of the 
increased competition, these elites will spend as much as necessary in order to win; yet 
because of the competitive nature of the race the margins of victory will be relatively 
small.  This is an individual level finding that is similar to the incumbent spending 
dynamic found previously in aggregate level research (Levitt, 1994; Ragsdale and Cook, 
1987; Feldman and Jondrow, 1984). Two other points bear mentioning in the House 
analysis.  One, the efforts of the state parties in general (and particularly the Democratic 
state parties) do not appear to have much of an effect.  Only one state party activity had a 
statistically significant coefficient, and as discussed above, that activity did not produce 
the desired effect.  The second point worth mentioning is that the three control variables 
all perform as one would expect.  Increasing Republican identification and income make 
one more likely to vote Republican for the House while being nonwhite makes one less 
likely to do so. 
 The second column of Table 5-1 presents the results for voting for U.S. Senate.  
Again, only three of the eight campaign variables exhibit statistically significant 
coefficients.  Yet this time, the coefficients have signs that are in the expected direction.  
Thus, in Senate elections, increased advertising and grassroots contact by the Democratic 
candidate makes one less likely to vote for the Republican while increased advertising by 
the Republican candidate makes one more likely to vote for him or her. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
figures to account for the diminishing marginal returns of campaign spending. 
37 For more information, see Fritz and Morris (1992). 
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Table 5-1 
Individual Level Vote Choice 
 
Variable House Senate 































































-2 Log Likelihood 3268.802 2899.465 
Percent Correctly Predicted 78.17 81.59 
Number of Cases 3386 3336 
 
Cell entries are logit coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
a - significance = .0509 
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 This difference between House and Senate campaigns, with the efforts of the 
former producing a statistical artifact while the efforts of the latter produce a campaign 
effect, is one that has been identified previously in the literature (For House - Levitt, 
1994; Ragsdale and Cook, 1987; Feldman and Jondrow, 1984; For Senate – Moon, 2002; 
Gerber, 1998; Abramowitz, 1988).  It could be the product of many House races being 
uncompetitive – thus producing the reverse coefficients when those in the few 
competitive races spend a lot – while Senate races tend to be more competitive.  Another 
explanation would be that Senate races tend to have a higher profile than House races, 
and as such voters are more likely to perceive the efforts of the Senate campaigns than 
those of the House campaigns.  This second explanation is made all the more reasonable 
when one considers that the unit of analysis in this instance is the individual while the 
measures of campaign activity are aggregations, added to the individual-level data 
depending on the district in which that individual resides. 
 As with the House analysis, the Senate analysis also shows a glaring 
unimportance of the campaign spending by state political parties.  None of the four 
measures of state party campaign activity exhibit a statistically significant coefficient.  
And as was the case before, the control variables work as expected in the Senate analysis, 
with stronger Republican identification making one more likely to vote Republican and 
being nonwhite making one less likely to do so. 
 Turning to the question of turnout, previous research at the individual level has 
shown how campaigns can mobilize people to turnout to vote.  Experimental research, in 
particular, has found that grassroots contacting (Gerber and Green, 2000) and media 
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advertising (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995) increase the likelihood of voting.  In 
addition, survey research has shown that individuals are more likely to turnout to vote 
when they are mobilized by political elites (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; 
Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) or when the campaigns 
are engaged in a particularly close race (Cox and Munger, 1989). 
 To test for turnout effects, I again use NES data with merged campaign spending 
data.  Based on the previous literature, one would have to expect that the efforts of 
candidate and party campaigns of both parties would serve to mobilize voters.  In 
addition to the campaign variables, I include several control variables related to turnout.  
Race, education, age (and age-squared, to account for the nonlinear relationship), and 
efficacy are individual level characteristics that are associated with political participation 
(Wayne, 2000; Shields and Goidel, 1997; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba and 
Nie, 1972).  Residential mobility is another factor that affects turnout, though in this 
case increased mobility decreases the likelihood of participating (Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).  Finally, psychological characteristics 
such as interest in the campaign and the strength of one’s partisan identification are 
related to the decision to turnout (Campbell et al., 1960).  I also include a measure of the 
level of competition, not only to control for more spending occurring in more 
competitive races, but also because increased competition tends to motivate people to 
turnout to vote (Cox and Munger, 1989).  Finally, given the pooled nature of the analysis, 
I have included dummy variables for the years. 
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   I estimate the turnout model on respondents in 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2000.  I 
omit 2002 from this analysis because the CFAP did not make available the data on 
campaign spending for House candidates in 2002.   
 The results of the individual level turnout analysis are presented in Table 5-2.  
Since the dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual turned out to vote and 0 if the 
individual did not, positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood voting and 
negative coefficients a decreased likelihood. 
 In the analysis of turnout, none of the eight campaign variables have statistically 
significant coefficients, though all of the control variables exhibit coefficients that are 
statistically significant and in the expected direction.  This lack of effect runs contrary to 
conventional wisdom as well as previous findings (e.g. Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994; 
Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985).  However, two important caveats might lead one 
to believe that all hope is not lost for campaign effects.  First, as with the vote choice 
model, the turnout analysis relies on individual level data merged with aggregate level 
campaign data.  Since the campaign variables do not directly measure how much 
advertising or grassroots contact the individual was exposed to, it is possible that 
respondents in the NES sample are not “perceiving” these mobilization efforts38.  
Another important caveat involves the strategies used by political parties to target people 
with mobilization efforts.  Gershtenson (2003) shows that parties tend to target their 
mobilization efforts at those with “higher underlying propensities for political 
                                                        
38 Brox (2002) shows that individuals who were contacted by the parties were more likely to turnout in the 
2000 general election, and that campaign spending helps explain the incidence of party contact.  So it is 




Individual Level Turnout 
 
Variable Turnout 
Dem. State Party Advertising .0055 (.0120) 
Dem. State Party Grassroots -.0054 (.0175) 
Rep. State Party Advertising .0043 (.0083) 
Rep. State Party Grassroots .0112 (.0144) 
Dem. Candidate Advertising 1.49x10-5 
(2.38x10-5) 
Dem. Candidate Grassroots 1.74x10-5 
(3.38x10-5) 
Rep. Candidate Advertising -3.10x10-5 
(1.88x10-5) 
Rep. Candidate Grassroots 5.93x10-6 
(2.25x10-5) 
Strength of Party Identification .3224 (.0403)** 
Interest .9864 (.0584)** 
Efficacy .0045 (.0010)** 
Age .0912 (.0124)** 
Age-Squared -.0007 (.0001)** 
Education .3790 (.0266)** 
Race -.3603 (.0926)** 
Length of Residence .2887 (.0325)** 
Level of Competition .0559 (.0287)a 
1994 Dummy -.8540 (.1067)** 
1998 Dummy -.9504 (.1333)** 
2000 Dummy .0338 (.1460) 
Constant -6.4506 (.3563)** 
-2 Log Likelihood 4252.173 
Percent Correctly Predicted 78.05 
Number of Cases 4637 
 
Cell entries are logit coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
a  - significance = .0516 
 
participation,” (p. 20).  If candidates are doing likewise, it would explain why all of the 
control variables have statistically significant coefficients while none of the campaign 
activity variables do. 
133 
The Partisan Nature of Campaign Effects 
 While the previous two individual level analyses provide marginal support for 
vote choice effects and no support for turnout effects, it is possible that lumping all voters 
together into one pool is conflating two distinct forces at work in each process.  For 
example, in the choice between candidates, campaign efforts might activate some voters 
and persuade others.  Activation is the process by which political elites (in this case 
candidates and parties) stimulate voters to behave in accordance with their underlying 
political predispositions.  The most fundamental of these predispositions is party 
identification (Anderson and Iyengar, 1998), and campaign activity makes partisans even 
more likely to vote based on that identification (Iyengar and Petrocik, 2000; 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Finkel, 1993; Gelman and King, 1993).  Persuasion, on 
the other hand, is the process by which political elites induce voters to vote for a 
candidate they were not previously disposed to support.  Campaigns have the potential to 
persuade voters (Shaw, 1999b), though this effect may be limited if there is a balanced 
campaign environment or if voters’ existing predispositions make them resistant to 
persuasive messages contrary to their established views (Zaller, 1992). 
 In order to assess whether candidate and party campaign activity is activating or 
persuading voters, I perform the same vote choice analysis as described above, except in 
this case I run it separately on subsamples of Democrats (including independent leaning 
Democrats), independents, and Republicans (including independent leaning 




Individual Level Vote Choice in the House – By Party 
 
Variable Democrats independents Republicans 






























































































-2 Log Likelihood 1580.643 264.038 1384.415 
Percent Correctly Predicted 80.08 63.43 78.55 
Number of Cases 1697 216 1473 
 
Cell entries are logit coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
a - significance = .0541 
b - significance = .0526  
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 As a whole, the results provide limited support for activation and an unusual 
finding indicating possible reverse persuasion.  Among Democrats, spending by 
Democratic candidates and parties had no effect.  However advertising done by state 
Republican parties and grassroots contact performed by Republican candidates made 
Democrats less likely to vote for the Republican candidate for U.S. House.  This likely 
stems from Democratic voters perceiving Republican campaign efforts and reacting 
negatively toward them, thus activating their own underlying partisanship.  Among 
Republicans, however, no such activation occurs, either as a result of their own party’s 
efforts or as a backlash against Democratic campaign activities.  Finally among 
independents, a statistically significant and positive coefficient for Democratic state party 
grassroots spending suggests that independents that were the recipients of these efforts 
were persuaded in favor of the Republican candidate.  This result should be seen as 
irrational behavior on the part of Democratic state parties, as for some reason the 
messages contained in these grassroots contacting activities were not appealing to 
independents. 
 The results for Senate elections are presented in Table 5-4.  These results provide 
stronger support for both activation and persuasion.  Among partisans, both processes 
were at work.  Advertising by the Democratic candidate made Democrats less likely to 
vote for the Republican (activation) while advertising by the Republican candidate made 
Democrats more likely to vote for him or her (persuasion).  Similarly, advertising and 
grassroots contact by the Democratic candidate made Republicans less likely to vote for 
the Republican (persuasion) while advertising by the Republican candidate made 
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Republicans more likely to vote for him or her (activation).  In the case of independents, 
where persuasion is the only possible process because there are no partisan 
predispositions to activate, Democratic candidate grassroots contact makes these voters 
less likely to vote for the Republican candidate while Republican candidate advertising 
make them more likely to do so.  It should be noted that only the candidate activity items 
had any effect on voters in Senate elections; despite the congruence of their 
constituencies (i.e. a state), the efforts of state political parties did not seem to activate or 
persuade voters in Senate races. 
 Campaign activity by candidates and parties not only activates and persuades – it 
can also affect the decision to turnout.  And as was the case with vote choice, campaign 
activity might manifest itself in two distinct effects:  mobilization or demobilization.  
Mobilization is the process of motivating individuals to participate in politics (in this 
case, vote), either by reducing the costs associated with participation or by increasing its 
benefits (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994).  Previous work has shown mobilization 
effects associated with party contacting (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994), nonpartisan 
grassroots activities (Gerber and Green, 2000; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee, 1999), 
candidate campaign spending (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985), and television 
advertising (Kahn and Kenney, 1999; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995).  Demobilization, 
on the other hand, occurs when campaign activity reduces the likelihood that an 
individual will turnout to vote.  Much of the support for demobilization effects comes 
from studies of negative campaign advertising (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon, 1999; 
Kahn and Kenney, 1999; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere et al., 1994). 
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Table 5-4 
Individual Level Vote Choice in the Senate – By Party 
 
Variable Democrats independents Republicans 






























































































-2 Log Likelihood 1322.744 203.715 1248.146 
Percent Correctly Predicted 82.64 66.19 82.62 
Number of Cases 1613 210 1513 
 
Cell entries are logit coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
a - significance = .0531 
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 In order to assess whether candidate and party campaign activity is mobilizing or 
demobilizing voters, I perform the same turnout analysis as described above, except in 
this case I run it separately on subsamples of Democrats (including independent leaning 
Democrats), independents, and Republicans (including independent leaning 
Republicans).  The results are presented in Table 5-5. 
 The results provide very limited support for mobilization and demobilization 
effects.  In essence, only Republican candidate activity exerts effects, and only in the case 
of turnout among Democrats.  Among those individuals, Republican candidate 
advertising demobilizes39 while Republican candidate grassroots contact mobilizes40.  
Republican candidate grassroots contact also appears to demobilize Republicans, though 
this is most likely an artifact of increased grassroots activity in competitive districts, 
where the closeness of the race forces candidates to spend more to try to mobilize 
otherwise marginal participants. 
 Two other findings stand out, one expected and the other unexpected.  Among 
independents, no form of campaign activity mobilizes these individuals to turnout to vote.  
This result is expected, as parties and candidates would rather ignore independents and 
others whom the elites are not sure will cast a vote in their favor (Goldstein and Ridout, 
2002).  Quite unexpected, however, is the fact that no form of state party campaign 
activity mobilizes partisans or demobilizes other-partisans.  Given that one of the prime 
roles of parties in a candidate-centered era is to mobilize voters, this null finding is either 
                                                        
39 One could speculate that Republican candidate advertising demobilizes Democrats because they find it 
persuasive, yet would prefer not to turnout rather than turnout and cast a vote for the candidate of the other 
party. 
40 Presumably as a result of activating partisan predispositions. 
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Table 5-5 
Individual Level Turnout – By Party 
 
Variable Democrats independents Republicans 
Dem. State Party Advertising .0106 (.0178) .0320 (.0361) -.0089 (.0197) 
Dem. State Party Grassroots -.0031 (.0252) .0318 (.0547) -.0246 (.0290) 
Rep. State Party Advertising .0068 (.0117) .0416 (.0246) -.0097 (.0140) 
Rep. State Party Grassroots .0087 (.0209) .0159 (.0404) .0170 (.0239) 
























Strength of Party Identification .3523 (.0718)** – .3905 (.0843)** 
Interest .9717 (.0826)** .9582 (.1752)** 1.0301 (.0985)** 
Efficacy .0059 (.0015)** .0079 (.0032)* .0017 (.0017) 
Age .0784 (.0171)** .0234 (.0397) .1322 (.0211)** 
Age-Squared -.0006 (.0002)** .0002 (.0004) -.0011 (.0002)** 
Education .3928 (.0392)** .4026 (.0807)** .3477 (.0426)** 
Race -.2373 (.1217)a -.4025 (.2787) -.7171 (.1868)** 
Length of Residence .2761 (.0445)** .3526 (.0923)** .2649 (.0572)** 
Level of Competition .0524 (.0404) -.0981 (.0838) .1163 (.0493)* 
1994 Dummy -1.0219 (.1494)** -.9335 (.3360)** -.6622 (.1788)** 
1998 Dummy -1.2362 (.1829)** -.5345 (.4087) -.6655 (.2284)** 
2000 Dummy -.0125 (.2037) -.5519 (.4413) .2783 (.2477) 
Constant -6.2227 
(.5203)** 
-4.9599 (1.0042)** -7.4886 
(.6299)** 
-2 Log Likelihood 2373.195 477.040 1568.311 
Percent Correctly Predicted 77.83 77.55 80.13 
Number of Cases 2305 490 1842 
 
Cell entries are logit coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
a – significance = .0511 
 
an artifact41 or a monumental repudiation of much previous research and conventional 
wisdom.  At this point I favor the former explanation. 
                                                        
41 The lack of significant effects for state party campaign activity is more than likely a function of trying to 
tease out effects in an individual level model with aggregate measures of campaign activity.  As was the 
case with the earlier turnout model, without measures of how much of this campaign activity was actually 
received by the NES respondents, it is impossible to tell if these activity are having no effect or if they are 
merely not being perceived. 
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 To summarize the individual level analyses, one would have to say that there is 
only limited support for turnout and vote choice effects, though breaking the sample into 
partisan groups does permit us to see instances of activation, persuasion, mobilization, 
and demobilization.  Furthermore, the efforts of the state parties were largely irrelevant in 
producing those effects, an outcome that I will presently ascribe to having forced 
aggregate data on campaign activity into individual level models.  Hence, one could 
claim that these models serve as conservative assessments of campaign effects.  
Aggregate level models, on the other hand, would match the campaign activity data to 
other district-level characteristics to predict vote share or rates of turnout.  Such analyses 
are perhaps a more appropriate test for the aggregated campaign activity data, and it is to 
these analyses that we now turn. 
 
Campaign Effects in the Aggregate 
 As discussed earlier, one expects increased campaign activity to be associated 
with increased support at the polls and higher turnout.  In the aggregate, this expectation 
leads one to believe that increased campaign spending by a candidate or party will 
increase the vote share received by that candidate (or that party’s candidate).  It also 
suggests that increased campaign spending will yield higher turnout rates in the district. 
 Studies using aggregate analyses have shown that campaigns can persuade voters 
and thus affect aggregate vote totals.  The broadest indicator of campaign effort – 
campaign spending – has been shown to affect state-level vote share (Nagler and 
Leighley, 1992).  Several components of the campaign have also been shown to have an 
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impact on voters in the aggregate.  Appearances (Herr, 2002; Shaw, 1999b) campaign 
events (Shaw, 1999a; Holbrook, 1994), national conventions (Holbrook, 1996, 1994; 
Campbell, Cherry, and Wink, 1992) and debates (Holbrook, 1996, 1994) all have an 
effect on voters’ preferences among candidates. 
 In order to test the impact of voter contact spending on aggregate voting in 
Congressional elections, I use data on races for U.S. House and Senate from 1992 to 2002 
to estimate linear models of vote choice and turnout.  For the former, I estimate separate 
models for House and Senate elections.  As explanatory variables I include measures of 
Republican and Democratic candidate advertising spending and grassroots contact 
spending.  I also include measures of Republican and Democratic state party 
advertising spending and grassroots contact spending.  In addition to these main 
variables of interest, I include a control variable to account for the partisan leanings of the 
district.  I ran the analyses once using previous (Republican) vote percent in the district 
as the control, a method that is used frequently in aggregate vote choice studies (e.g. 
Shaw, 1999b; Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994).  I then ran the same analyses with an 
ordinal measure of competition as the control in order to incorporate a measure that was 
drawn from the same timeframe as the rest of the data.  Finally, given the pooled nature 
of the analyses, I have included dummy variables for the years. 
 As with the individual level analyses, I estimate the House model for only 1992, 
1994, 1998, and 2000 since the CFAP did not make available the data on campaign 
spending for House candidates in 2002.  The Senate model includes 2002. 
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 The results of the aggregate model of House elections are presented in Table 5-6.  
Since the dependent variable is coded as the percent won by the Republican candidate, 
positive coefficients indicate an effect that increases Republican vote share while 
negative coefficients indicate a negative effect on Republican performance. 
 In the analysis of voting for the U.S. House of Representatives, two findings are 
striking.  One, candidate efforts appear to have a significant impact on aggregate vote.  In 
the model with the previous percent control, coefficients for all four candidate variables 
are statistically significant and in the expected direction.  In the model that uses level of 
competition as the control, three of the four candidate variables have statistically 
significant coefficients in the expected direction.  It seems we can conclude with 
confidence that Democratic candidate advertising and grassroots contact will reduce the 
Republican vote share in House elections while Republican candidate advertising and 
grassroots contact will increase it.  The other finding of note, however, is that none of the 
state party campaign variables have statistically significant coefficients.  While this does 
not support my expectations, it is perhaps not a surprise given the notion that the role of 
parties is to motivate committed supporters to turnout while leaving persuasion efforts to 




Aggregate Vote Choice – House 
 












































1998 Dummy .319 
(.625) 
a 








R2 .847 .775 
Number of Cases 1600 698 
 
Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
a  - This variable was excluded from the analysis by the data analysis software 
 
 The analysis of voting for the U.S. Senate provides results that are not quite as 
clear-cut.  The results of that analysis are presented in Table 5-7. 
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Table 5-7 
Aggregate Vote Choice – Senate 
 




























































R2 .893 .653 
Number of Cases 165 111 
 
Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
 
As with House campaigns, several measures of candidate campaign activity had 
statistically significant coefficients in the expected direction.  In the model using previous 
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percent as the control, for example, both Republican and Democratic candidate 
advertising had an effect on voters.  Grassroots contact by both candidates, on the other 
hand, had no statistically significant effect, and neither did any of the activities performed 
by the state political parties.  In the model using level of competition as the control, 
Democratic candidate advertising again reduces Republican vote share, but in this case it 
is Republican candidates grassroots contact – and not advertising – that has a statistically 
significant effect.  Furthermore, in this latter model one of the state party variables 
exhibits a statistically significant coefficient; Democratic state party advertising proves to 
reduce Republican vote share.  While this is not overwhelming evidence that state party 
efforts have an strong impact on vote share, it does make sense that any impact would be 
seen in Senate races, where the constituencies of the party and the candidate are the same 
(the entire state).  What is more certain, however, is that candidate efforts – particularly 
advertising – do have an effect on aggregate votes in Congressional elections. 
 Turning to the question of turnout, I again use district level voting data merged 
campaign spending data to estimate a linear model.  Previous research (Brox, 2002) as 
well as logic suggest that increased campaign activity should result in higher turnout 
rates.  In addition to the campaign variables, I include several control variables related to 
turnout.  Income, race, and residential mobility are individual level characteristics that are 
associated with political participation, so I have included aggregated measures of median 
household income, percent minority population in the district, and residential mobility 
in the model.  Contextual features also have an impact on aggregate turnout, so I include 
a measure counting the number of days before the election one has to be registered in 
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order to vote42 (registration days) as well as variables measuring the amount of 
competition in the state (presidential battleground, Senate competition, average 
House competition).  Given the pooled nature of the analysis, I have included dummy 
variables for the years.  Finally, in an effort to create a more parsimonious model, I 
estimate the model a second time, replacing all of the control variables (except the 
competition measures) with previous turnout, on the assumption that state-level 
characteristics that would affect turnout in a given year were also operating two years 
prior. 
   I estimate the turnout model on statewide voter turnout in 1992, 1994, 1998, and 
2000.  As before, I omit 2002 from this analysis because the CFAP did not make 
available the data on campaign spending for House candidates in 2002.   
 The results of the aggregate turnout analysis are presented in Table 5-8.  Since the 
dependent variable is coded as the percent of the voting age population turning out to 
vote, positive coefficients indicate an effect that increased the turnout rate while negative 
coefficients indicate an effect that decreased turnout. 
 Unfortunately, in the aggregate turnout analysis none of the eight campaign 
variables have statistically significant coefficients.  In the model with the aggregate 
control measures, measures of racial composition and registration requirements have 
statistically significant coefficients in the expected direction; in the model with previous 
percent, the measure of previous turnout does positively (and significantly) correlate with 
current turnout.  Yet the lack of impact of any of the campaign variables is disappointing  
                                                        
42 See Powell (1986) for a discussion of the impact of registration requirements on turnout. 
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Table 5-8 
Aggregate Turnout – Statewide 
 




Dem. State Party Advertising .072 (.116) -.085 (.118) 
Dem. State Party Grassroots -.240 (.204) -.237 (.206) 
Dem. Candidate Advertising .043 (.175) .099 (.181) 
Dem. Candidate Grassroots .063 (.234) -.074 (.238) 
Rep. State Party Advertising -.014 (.102) .031 (.105) 
Rep. State Party Grassroots .217 (.156) -.097 (.164) 
Rep. Candidate Advertising .118 (.232) .012 (.236) 
Rep. Candidate Grassroots 1.55 (.273) .289 (.278) 
Previous Turnout – .595 (.063)** 
Income 1.45x10-4 (.000) – 
Residential Mobility -.038 (.176) – 
Minority Population -.278 (.055)** – 
Registration Days -.274 (.057)** – 
Senate Competition .577 (.546) .678 (.553) 
Presidential Battleground -.170 (.462) .720 (.466) 
Average House Competition -.798 (1.868) 2.627 (1.852) 
1994 Dummy -15.155 (2.362)** -20.394 (3.563)** 
1998 Dummy -19.641 (2.623)** -18.710 (2.527)** 
2000 Dummy -5.070 (2.647)a -.146 (2.364) 
Constant 57.822 (5.170)** 26.730 (3.860)** 
R2 .776 .753 
Number of Cases 127 127 
 
Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
** - significant at .01 level 
* - significant at .05 level 
a – significance = .058 
 
and probably erroneous.  As was the case at the individual level, multiple processes are 
probably at work, with parties working not to increase total turnout but only turnout 
among likely supporters (and possibly working to demobilize opponents).  It is possible 
that with data at a lower level of aggregation (county, or voter tabulation district) that 
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includes measures of underlying partisanship or normal voting, these campaign efforts 
would be shown to have mobilization and/or demobilization effects. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The preceding analyses provide some interesting detail regarding the campaign 
effects associated with candidates and parties involved in campaigns for Congress.  In 
general, it appears that candidate activity has an important impact on vote choice and 
perhaps an impact on turnout.  State party activity, on the other hand, does not have much 
of an impact on vote choice or turnout when included in models that control for the 
activity of the candidates. 
 But that candidate activity does have some varied effects.  Advertising and 
grassroots contacting showed both activation and persuasion effects at the individual 
level.  In the aggregate, candidate advertising and grassroots contact were associated with 
higher vote total for the sponsoring candidate.  At the individual level, the effects were 
more prominent in Senate elections while in the aggregate, the effects were more 
prominent in House elections. 
 By considering the efforts of both candidates and parties, and by counting only 
those components of the campaign designed to reach voters, this paper provides a clearer 
picture of what types of campaigns have effects, what those effects are, and in what 
circumstances do they manifest themselves.  But an even better description of campaign 
effects would be possible if better data were used within the analytical framework 
presented here.  With regard to the turnout analyses, gathering data from a lower level of 
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aggregation, data that included district partisanship or normal voting, would permit a 
more nuanced look at the mobilization and demobilization effects of campaign activity.  
It is likely that effects associated with state party campaigning would manifest 
themselves there.  Also, finding campaign spending data disaggregated into distinct time 
periods throughout the fall campaign season would permit aggregate level analyses in 
which campaign activity could be matched to time-series polling data.  Such an analysis 
would help answer questions related to when partisans are activated to support the party’s 
candidate, when independent and other-party voters are susceptible to persuasion, and 
when campaign effects on vote choice cease and candidates and parties should begin 
focusing on mobilizing supporter.  Yet with a framework that looks to both candidates 
and parties and focuses solely on voter contact spending, such questions are well worth 
exploring. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
 The context of American elections changed dramatically over the past 10 years.  
Not only did the amount of money in politics increase dramatically between 1992 and 
2002, but the regulatory environment in which that money was raised and spent also 
changed.  Contextual changes such as Motor Voter legislation and Congressional 
redistricting changed the playing field for candidates and parties, giving the former new 
districts in which to compete and forcing both to attend to new groups of voters.  
Furthermore, technology brought about opportunities for candidates and parties to reach 
voters in novel and interactive ways. 
 With these changes we would expect that Congressional campaigns would change 
dramatically as well.  Given that political elites – candidates as well as party leaders – 
respond strategically to the electoral context, it is only natural that they will adapt their 
campaign techniques in ways that help them achieve their goal of winning elective office.  
Such strategic behavior is most clearly manifested in the way they create campaigns, and 
specifically in the way they allocate resources to various campaign components.  Thus as 
many elections have become less competitive over the last decade, we should expect to 
see different types of campaigns as time moves forward:  campaigns for sure winners will 
look quite distinct from the sure losers, and those in the few competitive races will spend 
lots of money, most of which will be devoted to activating, persuading, and mobilizing 
voters. 
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 The implications of these changes are important for American democracy, as 
elections nominally select government officials and implicitly decide who gets 
represented and what policies will be enacted.  Since campaigns affect voters who in turn 
decide election outcomes, by looking at campaigns and their effects, we shed light into 
the first stage of the democratic process and illustrate how the campaign behavior of 
candidates and parties translates into public policy. 
 
Summary of Results 
 The empirical chapters of this dissertation provide insight into three aspects of 
recent Congressional campaigns.  First, they describe the breadth of activity in campaigns 
and how campaign activity varies among candidates and between candidate and party 
campaigns.  Next, they discuss the factors that parties and candidates considering when 
making decisions regarding the allocation of resources to various components of a 
campaign.  Finally, they assess the impact of campaigns on voters in Congressional 
elections, using both individual and aggregate models and giving particular attention to 
those components of the campaign designed to mobilize and persuade voters. 
 
Describing Campaigns 
 In Chapter 3, I use Federal Election Commission data on campaign spending to 
describe candidate and party campaigns in Congressional elections from 1992 to 2002.  
When adjusted for inflation, campaign spending increased dramatically for all House 
candidates (especially those running in open seats) and for Senate candidates running for 
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open seats.  Indeed, while incumbent spending advantages over challengers remained 
relatively constant over the period, spending by open seat candidates began to look 
remarkably like that of incumbents.  Among state parties, spending increased during the 
ten year period, and I observe a see-saw pattern of higher levels of spending during the 
more intense presidential election years and lesser spending during the midterm election 
years. 
 Regarding how that money is spent, I find that candidates spend most of their 
funds on voter contact.  Indeed, 50 to 60 percent of candidate campaign budgets go to 
voter contact, with Senate candidates spending a larger portion of that on advertising and 
House candidates spending more on grassroots campaigning.  Candidate then devote 
around a quarter of their budgets to overhead and a smaller fraction to fundraising.  
Parties, given that they are permanent organizations, spend more on overhead – generally 
55 to 60 percent of their budgets.  They devote another third to voter contact.   
 
Strategic Behavior 
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I show how several factors play a role in determining where 
candidates and parties allocate resources.  For candidates, the most important factor is 
competition.  Increased competitiveness leads to increased campaign spending on 
overhead, fundraising, voter contact, and decreased spending on donations to other 
candidates and groups.  Parties, on the other hand, seem only to consider competition 
when making spending decisions on advertising.  Indeed, analyses in Chapter 4 suggest 
153 
that competition is the only factor that candidates and parties consider when allocating 
resources to advertising. 
 But competition is now the only factor that these strategic politicians consider 
when allocating campaign resources.  Candidate status is an important predictor of 
resource allocation among Senate candidates.  For House candidates and state parties, the 
campaigns waged by Presidential and Senate candidates bear on the formers’ resource 
allocation decisions.  The analyses of Chapter 4 suggest that strategic politicians look to 
what others in their area are doing before they allocate precious funds to important 
components of the campaign. 
 
Campaign Effects 
 In Chapter 5 I provide an innovative assessment of campaign effects.  By focusing 
on only those components of the campaign designed to reach voters, I avoid generating 
biased estimates of campaign effects that one gets by using total campaign spending.  I 
augment these campaign data with National Election Studies data so that I can estimate 
individual level models of turnout and vote choice.  I use aggregate voting and contextual 
data to estimate district (or state) level models of turnout and vote choice as well. 
 At the individual level, it is important to consider different types of campaign 
effects.  By estimating the models separately for Democrats, independents, and 
Republicans, I show how the efforts of the parties can have both persuasion and 
activation effects on vote choice, and both mobilization and demobilization effects on 
turnout.  Specifically, the results at the individual level show that candidate efforts have 
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activation effects in House elections and both activation and persuasion effects in Senate 
elections.  Regarding turnout, the evidence is more limited, but results are suggestive of 
both mobilization and demobilization effects associated with candidate efforts.  
Unfortunately, the individual level results in Chapter 5 show that state party campaigns 
do not have much of an impact on vote choice or turnout when included in models that 
control for the activity of the candidates. 
 In the aggregate, campaign effects are clearly visible.  In the case of House 
elections, candidate efforts have the expected effects on vote totals, while in the case of 
Senate elections the results are more mixed, but there is nonetheless evidence that 
advertising and/or grassroots campaigning has an effect on vote totals.  Unfortunately, the 
efforts of the state parties are largely unimportant in the explanation of voting in the 
aggregate.  Furthermore, the efforts of both candidates and parties did not appear to 
influence aggregate turnout once one controls for other factors know to influence voter 
participation. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
 Given the importance of, as well as the interest in, research into campaigns, it is 
important the future studies of campaign and campaigns effects consider the two main 
contributions of this project:  a focus on those components of the campaign designed to 
reach voters, and a conception of the campaign as the product of the efforts of the many 
groups (the candidate and party organizations, in particular) working to win the election.  
With that said, there are several avenues for future research in this area. 
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 First, research into the nature and effects of campaign spending would benefit 
from having campaign spending data coded by the date of expenditure.  By knowing 
when campaigns are spending money on particularly components or activities, two types 
of analyses are possible.  One type is descriptive work that would show how spending 
priorities change over the course of the campaign.  The other type is work into the 
strategic nature of resource allocation; such research would show how resource allocation 
shifts based on changing circumstances (shifts in voter preferences, opponent 
expenditures, campaigning by outside groups). 
 A second avenue of future research would be to assess optimal resource allocation 
strategies given different circumstances.  With extensive data on campaign spending and 
aggregate voting, it would be interesting to know what is the best possible method for 
allocating resources to the various components of the campaign.  With additional 
contextual data, such analyses could be extended to discuss optimal resource allocation 
given varying electoral contexts; for example, such work could show what the best 
resource allocation strategy would be for an experienced challenger facing a weak 
incumbent in a presidential election year. 
 A third avenue of future research would be to consider a broader array of 
campaigns.  The preceding analyses only take into account the campaigns created by the 
candidates and the state political parties.  Future work should seek to incorporate the 
efforts of county and local party organizations, interest groups, labor unions, 527 
committees, and other who join in the effort to influence the outcome of a particular 
election. 
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 Finally, future research in this area should consider of a broader array of effects.  
The preceding analyses are limited to vote choice and turnout effects – the effects most 
important from the point of view of those running the campaigns.  But the efforts 
described in the preceding chapters will have effects on other aspects of campaigns such 
as voter learning and sophistication, intra-campaign shifts of public opinion, and the 
dynamics of future campaigns such as fundraising and challenger entry. 
 Future scholars will be left with these, and many other, questions that will 
certainly be answerable with sufficient data and clear focus on campaigns and their role 
in American democracy. 
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Appendix – Description of Variables 
 




district – 0 indicates Senate candidate 
candidate 
party 
votes – from USHR clerk’s website – 
http://clerk.house.gov/members/electionInfo/elections.html 
percent – calculated 
status – incumbent, challenger, or open seat candidate 
win – 1 if winner, 0 if loser 
turnout – from USHR clerk’s website 
sqrmile – land area of the district in square miles – Adler, E. Scott.  “Congressional 
District Data File.”  University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. 
Comp1 – competitiveness of the district – 0 (safe dem), 1 (likely dem), 2 (leans dem), 3 
(tossup), 4 (leans rep), 5 (likely rep), 6 (safe rep) – data are from Roll Call on the 
following dates: 3/2/92, 3/9/92, 6/15/92, 6/18/92, 6/22/92, 5/9/94, 5/12/94, 
5/20/94, 5/18/98, 5/15/00, 5/20/02 – any gaps in those data filled in from CQ 
Weekly Report on the following dates: 9/19/92, 10/24/92, 10/8/94, 10/22/94, 
10/24/98, 9/23/00, 10/5/02, 10/26/02 
Comp2 – Comp 1 “folded in half” – measures absolute competitiveness without partisan 
 dimension – 0 (uncompetitive), 1 (slightly competitive), 2 (somewhat 
competitive), 3 (highly competitive) 
Campaign finance data – from www.campaignfinanceanalysisproject.com - see further 
 description at Fritz and Morris (1992), pp. xi-xii. 
  all – total campaign spending 
  unitem – unitemized expenses 
  parties – donations to party organizations 
  ideogrp – donations to ideological groups 
  civicorg – donations to civic organizations 
  other – donations to candidates in other states 
  same – donations to candidates in the same state 
  cge – constituent gifts and entertainment 
  staffvol – staff and volunteer expenses 
  pmb – persuasion mail and brochures 
  tradcamp – traditional (grassroots) campaigning 
  othermed – other media advertising 
  elecmed – electronic media advertising (including internet) 
  polling – polling expenses 
  telemktg – telemarketing (fundraising) expenses 
  dirmail – direct mail (fundraising) expenses 
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  events – cost of fundraising events 
  foodmtg – food and meeting expenses 
  travel 
  equip – computers and office equipment 
  campauto – campaign automobiles 
  telephon – telephone expenses 
  lawyacct – lawyer and accountant fees 
  bankfees – bank and investment fees 
  othertax – other taxes 
  salary – salary and payroll taxes 
  rentutil – rent and utility payments 







VAP – voting age population – from FEC website – www.fec.gov 
turnout – 1994 from USHR clerk’s website – other years from FEC website 
sqrmile – land area of the state in square miles – Adler, E. Scott.  “Congressional District 
Data File.” University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. 
Comp1 – competitiveness of the state – calculated from aggregate votes for USHR in all 
districts in a state – calculated as absolute margin of (Dem % – Rep %) – score 
for each year is the average of the margins from that year’s election and the 
previous two (i.e. 92Comp1=(92AbsMargin + 90AbsMargin + 88AbsMargin)/3) 
Comp2 – rescaled so that higher values indicate increased competitiveness – 
 Comp2 = (100–Comp1) 
Campaign finance data – state party administrative spending files from 
ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ - coded by author based on guidelines from Fritz and 
Morris (1992), pp. xi-xii. 
  all – total campaign spending 
  unitem – unitemized expenses 
  cge – constituent gifts and entertainment 
  staffvol – staff and volunteer expenses 
  pmb – persuasion mail and brochures 
  tradcamp – traditional (grassroots) campaigning 
  othermed – other media advertising 
  elecmed – electronic media advertising (including internet) 
  polling – polling expenses 
  telemktg – telemarketing (fundraising) expenses 
  dirmail – direct mail (fundraising) expenses 
  events – cost of fundraising events 
  foodmtg – food and meeting expenses 
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  travel 
  equip – computers and office equipment 
  campauto – campaign automobiles 
  telephon – telephone expenses 
  lawyacct – lawyer and accountant fees 
  bankfees – bank and investment fees 
  othertax – other taxes 
  salary – salary and payroll taxes 
  rentutil – rent and utility payments 
  supplies – office furniture and supplies 
 
Variables in Chapter 4 
Campaign spending variables – all variables were adjusted to 2002 constant dollars, then 
adjusted for every 1000 voters, then logged 
Overhead – furniture and office supplies, rent and utility payments, 
salaries and payroll taxes, other taxes, bank and investment fees, 
lawyer and accountant expenses, telephone expenses, automobile 
expenses, computers and office equipment, travel expenses, food 
and meeting expenses 
Fundraising – direct mail fundraising, fundraising events, telemarketing 
Advertising – electronic media advertising (including internet), other 
media advertising 
Grassroots contact – persuasion mail and brochures, traditional 
campaigning, staff and volunteer expenses 
Donations (candidates only) – to candidates in the same state, to 
candidates in other states, to civic organizations, to ideological 
groups, to political parties 
Level of Competition – competitiveness of the race – 0 (safe dem), 1 (likely dem), 2 
(leans dem), 3 (tossup), 4 (leans rep), 5 (likely rep), 6 (safe rep) – data are from 
Roll Call on the following dates: 3/2/92, 3/9/92, 6/15/92, 6/18/92, 6/22/92, 5/9/94, 
5/12/94, 5/20/94, 5/18/98, 5/15/00, 5/20/02 – any gaps in those data filled in from 
CQ Weekly Report on the following dates:  9/19/92, 10/24/92, 10/8/94, 10/22/94, 
10/24/98, 9/23/00, 10/5/02, 10/26/02 – measure is actually “folded in half” to get 
absolute level of competition (0-uncompetitive, 1-slightly competitive, 2-
somewhat competitive, 3-highly competitive) 
Presidential Battleground – 5-point scale based on data from Shaw (1999c) 
Gross Ratings Points – “average” number of gross ratings points purchased in the state by 
the presidential campaign – From Shaw (1999b) 
District Land Area – land area of the state in square miles – Adler, E. Scott.  
“Congressional District DataFile.” University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. 
Incumbent – dummy variable 
Open Seat – dummy variable 
Democratic – dummy variable 
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Variables in Chapter 5 
Individual Level Analyses 
Vote choice – 0 for Democrat, 1 for Republican 
Turnout – 0 for failure to vote, 1 for voting 
Campaign spending variables – all variables were adjusted to 2002 constant dollars, then 
adjusted for every 1000 voters, then logged 
Advertising – electronic media advertising (including internet), other 
media advertising 
Grassroots contact – persuasion mail and brochures, traditional 
campaigning, staff and volunteer expenses 
Party Identification – NES variable 
Income – NES variable 
Race – 0 if white, 1 if nonwhite 
Level of Competition – competitiveness of the race – 0 (safe dem), 1 (likely dem), 2 
(leans dem), 3 (tossup), 4 (leans rep), 5 (likely rep), 6 (safe rep) – data are from 
Roll Call on the following dates: 3/2/92, 3/9/92, 6/15/92, 6/18/92, 6/22/92, 5/9/94, 
5/12/94, 5/20/94, 5/18/98, 5/15/00, 5/20/02 – any gaps in those data filled in from 
CQ Weekly Report on the following dates:  9/19/92, 10/24/92, 10/8/94, 10/22/94, 
10/24/98, 9/23/00, 10/5/02, 10/26/02 – measure is actually “folded in half” to get 
absolute level of competition (0-uncompetitive, 1-slightly competitive, 2-
somewhat competitive, 3-highly competitive) 
Strength of Party Identification – 7 point NES variable “folded in half” 
Interest – NES variable 
Efficacy – NES variable 
Age – NES variable 
Age-Squared – computed from NES variable 
Education – NES variable 
Length of Residence (in one’s house) – NES variable 
 
Aggregate Analyses 
Percent vote for the Republican – calculated based on vote data from USHR clerk’s 
website – http://clerk.house.gov/members/electionInfo/elections.html 
Percent turnout – turnout divided by voting age population – data from USHR clerk’s 
website, Federal Election Commission, and Electoral Assistance Commission 
Level of Competition – as above 
Previous Percent – percent vote for Republican in the district in the previous election 
Income – mean household income in the district or state 
Residential Mobility – percentage of the population that moved within the last two years 
Minority Population – percent of the population that is nonwhite 
Registration Days – number of days between Election Day and the close of voter 
registration 
Senate Competition – level of competition measure for Senate races 
Average House competition – average of level of competition for all state’s House races 
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